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ACCESSION ASPIRATIONS DEGENERATE:  
A NEW CHAPTER FOR TURKEY AND THE EU 
PATRICK R. HUGG

 
ABSTRACT 
Political and judicial events in 2009 severely undermined Turkey’s 
negotiations to accede to full membership in the European Union (―EU‖). 
The ongoing accession dialogue has proven largely unproductive of its 
aims, and these new events have clarified the negative environment 
engulfing the process and warrant the conclusion that Turkey and the EU 
are better served by recognizing this reality and moving forward to a more 
constructive chapter of collaboration. 
In the June 2009 European Parliamentary elections, rightist parties 
inhospitable to Turkey’s EU aspirations won large numbers of seats amid 
a campaign in which political rhetoric dangerously broadened the range 
of acceptable criticism of immigration, Islamic culture, and Turkey itself. 
Concurrently, EU organs and Member States continued an ongoing policy 
of scrutinizing Turkey’s progress to accession with a finer lens than was 
ever used before, and in fact vetoing the start of negotiations in many 
chapters of the EU acquis communitaire. Finally, the European Court of 
Justice issued its powerful Apolostolides v. Orams judgment, and the 
voters of the northern Cypriot community elected a new nationalist, right-
wing government known to oppose the United Nations (―U.N.‖) plan to 
reunite Cyprus on a federal, bi-zonal basis. Both of these latter 
developments further lessened the likelihood of progress in the U.N. 
negotiations to resolve the Cyprus division, one of the keys to Turkey’s 
own EU accession aspirations. 
All of these new developments combine to render Turkey’s accession to 
full membership in the EU improbable in this era, supporting the 
conclusion that Turkey and the EU should modify the present, unfruitful 
accession discussion and advance to a new, realistic framework for 
constructive dialogue and collaboration. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The conventional discussion of the past two decades regarding Turkey 
and its accession to the European Union may now be relegated to the past, 
allowing the EU-Turkey relationship to advance to a more realistic and 
fruitful chapter. Recent political and judicial events lay bare the futility of 
the arduous accession dialogue with a relieving clarity. The political 
impact of emerging concrete facts breaks through the previous aspirational 
dialogue and exposes its impracticality and even its layer of destructive 
pretense.
1
 That dialogue has proven largely unproductive of its stated aim 
to gain Turkish acceptance into the EU, frustrating its participants, and 
generating broad, negative reactions.
2
 Its demise is clarifying and may be a 
 
 
 1. The EU‘s handling of Turkey‘s enlargement process has been ―one of the (European) 
Union‘s clumsiest and most damaging foreign policy failures‖ with French and Austrian politicians 
―rushing to declare that Turkey could never join the EU, no matter what the EU‘s leaders had just 
unanimously agreed.‖ Kirsty Hughes, Opinion, An EU Muddle with Global Ramifications; Turkey and 
Europe, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 24, 2007, at 6.  
 Director of the International Crisis Group, Hugh Pope, finds an element of dishonesty in the 
current accession discussion portraying the accession as imminent, and therefore, unrealistically 
dangerous. Hugh Pope, Privileged Partnership Offers Turkey Neither Privilege Nor Partnership, 
TODAY‘S ZAMAN, June 23, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link= 
178770&bolum=109. 
 2. Public opinion in both the EU and Turkey has been negative towards the accession process. 
See, e.g., KATINKA BARYSCH, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, WHAT EUROPEANS THINK ABOUT 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/3
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good thing. These recent events make clear now that Turkey will not, in 
this era, be accepted into full membership in the European Union.  
Such a negative conclusion runs contrary to massive efforts and 
extensive achievements toward Turkey‘s accession—and surely contrary 
to the higher-minded hopes of many.
3
 The European Commission‘s 2008 
Progress Report extensively details those efforts.
4
 Turkey and the EU have 
dedicated substantial monetary resources toward legal and economic 
harmonization necessary for accession, and Turkey has already 
accomplished broad—even historic—law reform.5 With the ―EU acting as 
a catalyst—and demandeur—for reform,‖ Turkey has undergone a radical 
process of political, economic, and social change.
6
 
In a period of ten years, the Turkish Constitution was amended 
numerous times, followed by complementary legislative reforms, 
representing ―the most significant political transformation the Republic of 
Turkey had experienced since the introduction of multiparty politics in 
1945.‖7 Notably among other reforms, the death penalty was abolished, 
torture was outlawed, minorities were given greater protection, Kurds 
were given greater freedoms, and the army‘s role in government was 
reduced.
8
 The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU is in place, 
 
 
TURKEY AND WHY 1 (2007), http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_kb_turkey_24aug07.pdf. A 2009 
survey conducted by Istanbul‘s Bahçeşehir University revealed that 80% of Turkish respondents 
believed that the EU would not permit Turkey‘s accession, no matter what Turkey did. Love-Hate 
Relationship of Turkey with the EU, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS.COM, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ 
english/domestic/11765414.asp?scr=1 (last visited June 1, 2009). Three-quarters of respondents 
thought that the EU wanted to dismantle Turkey. Id. ―In 2009, the Turkish public very largely lost 
faith in the EU and Europe. The prospect of EU accession has largely faded, given the clear messages 
from Germany‘s Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.‖ Özdem Sanberk, We Must 
Not Let Political Blindness Triumph in Cyprus Again, TODAY‘S ZAMAN, June 16, 2009, http://www. 
todayszaman.com/tz-web/dtaylar.do?load=delay&link=176602&bolum=109. 
 3. This conclusion also runs counter to the author‘s previous writings in favor of Turkey‘s 
accession. See, e.g., Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of Turkey in Europe: Reconsidering the 
Luxembourg Exclusion, 23 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 606 (2000). 
 4. Turkey 2008 Progress Report Accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008–2009, COM 
(2008) 674 (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Turkey 2008 Progress Report]. 
 5. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: 
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2008–2009, at 4, 44–49, COM (2008) 674 final (May 11, 
2008) [hereinafter Enlargement Strategy 2008–2009] (detailed account of progress and additional 
reform needed). 
 6. Kirsty Hughes, The Political Dynamics of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European Success 
Story or the EU’s Most Contested Enlargement? 16 (Swedish Inst. for European Policy Studies, 
Report No. 9, 2004), available at http://www.sieps.se/en/dokument_/download-document/27-20049. 
html. 
 7. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: Debating the Most 
Difficult Enlargement Ever, SAIS REV. INT‘L AFF., Winter–Spring 2006, at 147, 149 (2006). 
 8. Id. at 147, 148–49. 
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annually yielding over €100 billion in bilateral trade.9 Countless meetings 
of EU and Turkish officials have convened to guide the importation of the 
EU‘s acquis communitaire, with its many thousands of pages of rules and 
regulations, into the Turkish legal system. Significant to legal science, 
Turkey‘s efforts toward adopting the EU acquis represent a ―unique 
experiment in using international harmonization as a tool in implementing 
a comprehensive reform strategy.‖10 Finally, many political and social 
leaders at the highest levels have broadly publicized the case for Turkey‘s 
accession.
11
 
Regrettably, the political will in Turkey and in EU Member States 
opposing its accession has shifted, as Turkey‘s reform efforts have slowed 
and the anti-Turkey rhetoric, described below, in some Member States has 
become extreme.
12
 Some Turkish commentators have argued that EU 
accession is not likely,
13
 and public opinion in the EU and Turkey has 
likewise shifted against Turkey‘s accession.14 ―Enlargement fatigue‖ in 
Western Europe, the current economic crisis, and resistance to Turkey‘s 
accession are leading factors pushing the candidacy further into 
jeopardy.
15
 Moreover, the rejection of the EU‘s Constitutional Treaty, the 
 
 
 9. Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 4, at 5. Turkey has become the EU‘s seventh 
largest trading partner. Id. 
 10. TURKEY: ECONOMIC REFORM & ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, at xviii (Bernard M. 
Hoekman & Sübidey Togan eds., 2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANET 
TRADE/Resources/Pubs/Turkey_BHoekman&STogan_book.pdf (providing an extensive review of 
Turkey‘s economic progress toward and implications of its joining the European Union). The Turkish 
example can be especially ―relevant for other countries that may seek to use a strategy of ‗deep 
integration‘ with a large, developed country or common market as a focal point and mechanism for 
undertaking both trade-related and regulatory reforms.‖ Id. 
 11. See, for example, Olli Rehn‘s 2008 speech, emphasizing the strategic importance of Turkish-
EU cooperation especially as instability threatens the Caucasus region. Olli Rehn, EU Enlargement 
Commissioner, Keynote Address at Bosphorus Conference: Turkey and the EU: A Win-Win Game 
(Oct. 10, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/speech_rehn_bosphorus_10oct 
2008.html). U.S. President Barack Obama endorsed Turkey‘s accession in a speech to the Turkish 
Parliament. President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Turkish Parliament (Apr. 6, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/remarks-by-president-obama-to-the-turkish-
parliament/). 
 12. Thomas Seibert, Turkey’s EU Bid No Longer Viable, NATIONAL (U.A.E.), June 16, 2009, 
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090617/FOREIGN/706169832/1013/NEWS (recounting German, 
French, and Turkish positions). Turkey‘s first government minister for EU affairs, Egemen Bagis, 
acknowledged that he does not find it realistic to expect Turkey‘s accession by 2014. Id. The European 
Commission has called on Turkey to ―renew its political reform effort.‖ Enlargement Strategy 2008–
2009, supra note 5, at 1. 
 13. See, e.g., Michael Van Der Galien, Turkey and the EU: Forget About It, HÜRRIYET, May 21, 
2009, at 11. 
 14. See supra note 2. 
 15. Posting of Katinka Barysch to Centre for European Reform Blog, http://centreforeuropean 
reform.blogspot.com/2009/02/why-enlargement-is-in-trouble.html (Feb. 24, 2009, 14:39). That Cyprus 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] A NEW CHAPTER FOR TURKEY AND THE EU 229 
 
 
 
 
difficult birthing of the Lisbon Treaty, and the divisions over EU 
economic cohesion in the current economic downturn suggest that today‘s 
EU will not offer the kind of strong leadership in marshaling the political 
forces needed to successfully push through Turkey‘s already controversial 
accession negotiations.
16
 
The EU and Turkey need each other for so many reasons; it is natural 
and prudent for them to strive for closer cooperation. Economics surely 
offers the leading reason, as the volume of trade grows, but energy and 
security concerns conduce the same co-dependence.
17
 In 2008, the 
European Commission concluded that Turkey‘s strategic importance to the 
EU has increased in recent times ―in key areas such as energy security, 
conflict prevention and resolution and regional security in the Southern 
Caucasus and the Middle East.‖18 The July 2009 agreement, signed in 
Ankara by leaders from four EU countries and Turkey, to go forward with 
the Nabucco pipeline to deliver natural gas from the Caspian Sea to the 
EU underscores this strategic location and the parties‘ eagerness to work 
together towards progress.
19
 Just as Germany and France could agree in 
the 1950s to deconstruct old national resistances for the sake of economic 
recovery and security, so, too, can Turkey and the EU do the same with 
their complementary resources in this period of hyper-trade-dependence 
and instability in eastern Europe, western Asia, and the Middle East.  
The well-known and well-worn reasons for and against Turkey‘s 
accession have been explicitly and repeatedly articulated.
20
 Turkey is not 
 
 
is holding Turkey hostage to gain leverage in the talks for the island‘s reunification is another key 
factor. Id. 
 16. ―An EU that is weak and divided in general, may stumble when faced with the political 
management of the Turkish accession process.‖ Hughes, supra note 6, at 95. Negative attitudes toward 
Turkey‘s possible accession to the EU were a factor in the 2005 French and Dutch rejections of the 
Constitutional treaty. CHRYSOSTOMOS PERICLEOUS, THE CYPRUS REFERENDUM: A DIVIDED ISLAND 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE ANNAN PLAN 73 (2009). 
 17. William H. Park, The Security Dimensions of Turkey-EU Relations, in THE EU & TURKEY, A 
GLITTERING PRIZE OR A MILLSTONE? 127 (Michael Lake ed., 2005). See also Dreams from Their 
Fathers, ECONOMIST, July 25, 2009, at 23–24. Turkey‘s strategic location bridging the Middle East 
and Europe offers valuable military and security capabilities, and can critically serve ―as a potential 
transit route for Europe-bound natural gas from energy-rich Azerbaijan and Central Asia, as well as 
from Iraq (and eventually Iran).‖ Id. 
 18. Enlargement Strategy 2008–2009, supra note 5, at 1. 
 19. Delphine Strauss, Leaders Push Ahead with Nabucco Pipeline, FIN. TIMES, July 13, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cd846434-6f93-11de-bfc5-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1. Turkey 
also has signed cooperation agreements allowing Russia to use Turkish territorial waters in the Black 
Sea for its South Stream pipeline project. ―Sitting at the crossroads of the energy-rich Middle East and 
the former Soviet Union, Turkey has unique leverage as a transit hub for gas.‖ Turkey and Russia: Old 
Rivals, New Partners, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 2009, at 47–48. 
 20. See, e.g., Antonio Missiroli, Crossing the Bosporus: Turkey’s Accession to the European 
Union, BROOKINGS, Oct. 1, 2004, www.brookings.edu/opinions/2004/1001europe_missiroli.aspx?p=1 
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geographically in Europe; Turkey is not culturally in Europe; Turkey has 
no true democratic tradition; Turkey bears a regrettable record of torture. 
Further, it is unthinkable that such a massive, poor, Islamic country would 
be allowed to enter the EU, either at the frequently discussed date of 2014 
or later,
21
 and then immediately become its largest, most populous 
Member State,
22
 drain the EU budget,
23
 and vote in the Council and 
Parliament with the political strength of Germany.
24
 ―As for power, 
Turkey‘s membership in the EU will have a big impact. Under either the 
Nice Treaty or the Constitutional treaty rules, Turkey would be the second 
most powerful member of the EU 29. . . . Plainly this situation might 
decrease the acceptability of . . . Turkey‘s membership.‖25 
Finally, Turkey‘s accession would seriously alter the balance in EU 
policy-making, drain the EU‘s structural and agriculture funds, and flood 
Europe with Turkish workers.
26
 The geopolitical center of Europe would 
be moved eastward by Turkey‘s inclusion, weakening the traditional 
French-German leadership axis, and ultimately diluting the EU to no more 
than a less cohesive, Anglo-Saxon free trade zone.
27
 
To the contrary, Turkey‘s proponents insist these arguments are either 
untrue or are outweighed by the compelling reasons for Turkey‘s 
admittance into the European family. First, one could emphasize that 
Turkey and the Turkish people are already part of the European family: 
 
 
(Senior research fellow Missiroli summarized arguments for and against Turkey‘s accession.). See also 
Bahri Yilmaz, The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever? 15 (Center for 
European Studies, Working Paper No. 167, 2008) (addressing Turkish-EU relations).  
 21. The European Council Summit in December 2004 acknowledged that Turkey‘s accession 
negotiations could not be concluded until an agreement was reached on the financial framework for the 
2014 cycle. Hughes, supra note 6, at 10. Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated in 2008 that he 
expected Turkey to enter the EU in ten to fifteen years ―should it continue reforms decisively.‖ EU 
Plans New Accession Negotiations with Turkey at Critical Time, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Apr. 21, 2008, 
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3281206,00.html. 
 22. ―Turkey is likely to have a population larger than Germany‘s 82 million by 2020, if not 
earlier.‖ TURKEY: ECONOMIC REFORM & ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 10, at 
xxxi. 
 23. If existing rules for economic contributions to and receipts from the EU budget were used, 
Turkey would become a net payee of some €12 billion, representing 14% of the total EU budget. Id. at 
xxxii. 
 24. Grigoriadis, supra note 8, at 156. 
 25. Richard Baldwin & Mika Widgrén, The Impact of Turkey’s Membership on EU Voting, in 
TURKEY: ECONOMIC REFORM AND ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 10, at 337. 
 26. Grigoriadis, supra note 8, at 153. European integrationists fear that Turkey‘s accession would 
further dilute the European cohesiveness, pushing it toward a less supranational organism. Id. at 152–
53. 
 27. Ioannis Michaletos, The Turkish-European Union Accession Negotiations: Probable 
Outcomes, RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES, Feb. 17, 2007, http://www. 
rieas.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=196&catid=18&Itemid=75. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/3
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Turkey has more territory and citizens on European soil than several other 
EU countries; Member State Cyprus lies farther east than most of Turkey; 
and Turkey has been a part of political Europe for centuries.
28
 
 The arguments that locate Turkey outside European history and 
geography cannot withstand analysis. For more than four centuries 
the Ottoman empire shared and shaped the political and strategic 
future of the continent. During the late 19th and early 20th century, 
it became the ―sick man of Europe‖. Even today, Turkey‘s historical 
and economic influence continues to be substantial.
29
 
Moreover, Turks were invited to Germany and other European 
countries to work beginning in the 1960s,
30
 and today four and a half to 
five million people of Turkish descent live in the EU,
31
 with over nine 
million more Turks living on the eastern side of the Bosporus in Turkey.
32
 
Turkey would ―add a young and dynamic economy to a sluggish and 
ageing EU.‖33 Europe would benefit economically, politically, and 
militarily by embracing a country on the geographic seam between Europe 
and the Middle East. The EU‘s common foreign and security policies 
would gain exponentially from Turkey‘s strong military force and its 
strategic location.
34
 It is also morally compelling to engage the diverse 
European and Asian parts of humanity into a single region to ameliorate 
 
 
 28. Turkey has been a member of almost all pan-European organizations from NATO and the 
OECD to the Council of Europe, ―and is, in many ways, closer to the EU than any other non-member.‖ 
Pope, supra note 1. 
 29. Tariq Ramadan, Comment and Debate, Turkey Is Part of Europe. Fear Keeps It Out of the 
EU, GUARDIAN (London), at 33. 
 30. Colin Nickerson, A Lesson in Immigration, Guest Worker Experiments Transformed Europe, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2006, at A1. In 1961, the first year of Germany‘s guest worker program, 
seven thousand Turks entered that country to work. Id. 
 31. One source estimates that 5.2 million Turks live in the twenty-seven EU countries. 
Experience of Euro-Turks, TURKOFAMERICA, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.turkofamerica.com/index. 
php?itemid=174&id=167&option=com_content&task=view (citing FARUK ŞEN, EURO-TÜRKLER: 
SAYILAR, ISTEMLER, ANALIZLER VE YORUMLAR [EURO-TURKS: THE PRESENCE OF TURKS IN EUROPE 
AND THEIR FUTURE] (2007)). 
 32. About ten percent of Turkey‘s population, over seven million people, live in the strictly 
European part of Turkey west of the Bosporus and Sea of Marmara, which is a larger population than 
in at least eleven present EU Member States. See TURKEY: A COUNTRY STUDY 75 (Helen Chapin 
Metz ed., 5th ed. 1995), available at http://countrystudies.us/turkey/18.htm; Europa: Member States of 
the EU, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_en.htm (click on each country on 
the map for population information) (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). Significant Turkish immigrant 
communities also live in Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
and Denmark. Hughes, supra note 6, at 74 n.51. 
 33. Enlargement & Turkey, Centre for European Reform, http://www.cer.org.uk/enlargement_ 
new/index_enlargement.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). 
 34. Patrick Seale, Turkey Clears a Hurdle into Europe, AGENCE GLOBAL, Dec. 20, 2004, 
http://www.agenceglobal.com/article.asp?id=356. 
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historical inequalities in rates of development and to forge future advances 
together. Finally, of course, Turkey has been repeatedly promised 
membership by the EU
35
 upon the satisfaction of the standard entrance 
obligations.
36
 In 1999, the EU Heads of State or Government, acting in the 
European Council, pronounced unequivocally: 
 The European Council welcomes recent positive developments 
in Turkey as noted in the Commission‘s progress report, as well as 
its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the 
Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the 
Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to other candidate 
States.
37
 
However, the official, hortatorical pronouncements and, indeed, the 
logic of the overall debate are subverted by a fundamental structural fault 
in the EU constitutional architecture. Every Member State must consent to 
every new member‘s accession, with no exceptions.38 Member States, 
moreover, have vetoes on vital threshold decisions to proceed in the stages 
of the negotiation process.
39
 In 2004, then President of the Republic of 
Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, explained that he had given up his right to 
veto Turkish candidacy at the 2004 EU Summit, but that he still held 
sixty-two small vetoes on the opening and closing of each chapter of 
 
 
 35. The original Association Agreement in 1963 ―clearly stated that Turkey was a European 
country, and foresaw . . . eventual [EU] membership.‖ Michael Lake, Introduction by the Editor to 
THE EU AND TURKEY, A GLITTERING PRIZE OR A MILLSTONE?, supra note 17, at 10. Both the 
preamble and article 28 of the Agreement include language that refers to Turkey‘s accession upon 
satisfaction of Community obligations. Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey, 1977 O.J. (L 361) 1–2, 8. Subsequently, ―the Helsinki European 
Council of December 1999 granted the official status of candidate country to Turkey. Accession 
negotiations were opened in October 2005.‖ Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 4. 
 36. Negotiations for accession began in October 2005 and are ―guided by Turkey‘s progress in 
preparing for accession, which will be measured, inter alia, against the implementation of the 
Accession Partnership, as regularly revised.‖ Council Decision 2008/157, 2008 O.J. (L 51) 4, 4 (EC); 
see id. at 4–18 (discussing the principles, priorities, and conditions contained in the Accession 
Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC). This most recent 
Council Decision explains that the Accession Partnership obliges Turkey to satisfy the criteria defined 
by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 (―Copenhagen Criteria‖) and other obligations of their 
―negotiating framework.‖ Id. at 6. These include the full spectrum of law reforms to insure a stable 
democracy, public administration, judiciary, economy, civil society, as well as specific provisions 
relating to its external relations with Cyprus and other neighbors. Id. at 6–18. 
 37. Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, ¶ 12 (Dec. 10–11, 1999), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm. 
 38. Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union requires unanimity in the Council for accession 
of new Member States. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 49, 2008 O.J. (C 
115) 13, 43. 
 39. Mark Beunderman, Cyprus Blocks Opening of First Chapter in EU-Turkey Talks, 
EUOBSERVER, June 9, 2006, http://euobserver.com/9/21819. 
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2010] A NEW CHAPTER FOR TURKEY AND THE EU 233 
 
 
 
 
accession negotiations.
40
 Cyprus, France, and other Member States have 
also blocked key negotiations.
41
 When viewed in the face of current 
developments, a reasonable observer must conclude that the twenty-seven 
Member States have little realistic hope of reaching the unanimity required 
to grant Turkey full membership in this era.
42
 
Recent events have dramatized this impasse. First, the June 2009 
European Parliament elections, ―in what is thought to be the biggest 
transnational vote in history,‖43 elevated many new explicitly anti-Turkey 
advocates to the EU legislature, strengthening national political parties 
that expressly vow to block Turkey‘s accession44 and moving the 
increasingly influential EU institution further to the right.
45
 Second, 
France, the Republic of Cyprus, and the EU as a whole continue to veto 
the opening of various aspects of negotiations toward Turkey‘s satisfaction 
of the acquis.
46
 Third, the 2009 European Court of Justice‘s decision in 
Apostolides v. Orams
47
 and the election of a new nationalist government in 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (―TRNC‖) have further eroded 
hopes for a Cyprus settlement.  
 
 
 40. Hughes, supra note 6, at 79 & n.61. Trouble may also lie ahead in the European Commission 
as well: ―This process will not be any easier for Turkey both because of the more stringent approach to 
ensuring implementation of the acquis and possibly also if some in the Commission bureaucracy 
continue to harbour doubts about the desirability of Turkish accession.‖ Id. at 86. 
 41. See infra Part III. 
 42. As more fully developed infra, the veto can and has been used to leverage accession issues of 
strong national interest. For example, Greece held the historic 2004 ―Big Bang‖ enlargement hostage 
until the other EU Member State leaders agreed to include even a divided Cyprus. Now, the Greek 
Cypriot Republic of Cyprus holds Turkey hostage, blocking further negotiating chapters from being 
opened. ―Greece [has] blocked all EU funds earmarked for Turkey for 20 years.‖ THE EU AND 
TURKEY, A GLITTERING PRIZE OR A MILLSTONE?, supra note 35, at 9. 
 43. The European Elections, Country by Country, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2009, http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB124444700376593655.html. 
 44. ―High on most far-right parties‘ to-do lists, however, is keeping Turkey out of the EU. 
Roberto Cota, a senior Northern League official, said the party would be working ‗above all to block 
illegal immigration and the entry of Turkey into the Union‘.‖ Vincent Boland et al., Far Right Makes 
Inroads Based on Exploits Rising Insecurity, FIN. TIMES (London), June 9, 2009, at 6. 
 45. Successive EU Treaties have entrusted increasing authority in the European Parliament. 
DAVID GALLOWAY, THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND: REALITIES AND ILLUSIONS OF POWER IN THE 
EU 115, 126–27 (2001). And the pending Treaty of Lisbon will do more of the same, making 
Parliament ―the equal of the Council in almost all EU legislation.‖ Wanted: A Vigorous Debate, 
ECONOMIST, June 6, 2009, at 49. The pending Treaty of Lisbon widens the European Parliament‘s co-
decision power (its legislative veto power) with the Council to thirty-three additional areas of 
legislative competence and increases its supervisory role in other areas as well. DAMIAN CHALMERS & 
GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS: UPDATING SUPPLEMENT 10 (2008). 
 46. See infra notes 117–41 and accompanying text. 
 47. Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, (EC) 2009 WL 1117885 (Apr. 28, 2009), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62007J0420:EN:HTML. 
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Turkey‘s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, returned to Brussels 
in June 2009, as one Greek newsman put it, ―trying to revive a European 
Union entry bid that is facing new signs of hostility from some member 
States. . . . [Yet] with membership talks almost at a standstill, . . . doubts 
[are raised] over whether Turkey‘s decades-old dream is attainable.‖48 
These events expose the reality that Turkey‘s potential accession poses 
controversial and complex issues that are unlikely to be resolved in the 
foreseeable future. Prudence suggests that the diverging sides recognize 
this reality and move forward. Much is to be gained by a productive 
relationship between Turkey and the EU. Discord in any form reaps the 
same negativity gains and opportunity losses. A period of cross-border 
catharsis must follow, leading to a positive recognition of the mutual 
benefits to be gained from closer and more open collaboration. Given all 
of this, the destructive pretense and drama over Turkey‘s possible full 
membership in the EU may end, and a new, more constructive dialogue 
may begin. 
II . THE MORE CONSERVATIVE NEW EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
The recent European Parliament elections widely publicized what 
many had softly spoken for some time: too many of Europe‘s citizens 
object to admitting Turkey into the EU. In the Parliamentary election 
campaigns of June 2009, rightist parties inhospitable to Turkey‘s EU 
aspirations won large numbers of seats,
49
 increasing their dominance, 
while the ―umbrella Socialist group . . . lost as many as a quarter of its 
seats.‖50 Equally significant, the political rhetoric of too many successful, 
 
 
 48. Ibon Villelabeitia, Erdogan Faces EU Gauntlet, KATHIMERINI, June 25, 2009, http://www. 
ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_world_2_25/06/2009_108367. ―The success of some conservative 
parties opposed to Turkey in this month‘s European Parliament election, in which EU ‗enlargement 
fatigue‘ and hostility to Ankara became a campaign issue in some countries, has dealt a blow to its 
hopes.‖ Id. 
 49. The European Parliament reports that the center-right European People‘s Party (―EPP‖) won 
264 seats, compared to 161 seats for the center-left. Results of the 2009 European Elections, http:// 
www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/index_en.html (last visited Oct. 3, 
2009). Even more worrisome, the EPP‘s number does not include several ultra-right, reactionary new 
MEPs, many of whom advocate stridently against Turkey‘s accession. See infra notes 65–103 and 
accompanying text. 
 50. Trouble at the Polls, ECONOMIST, June 13, 2009, at 14, 15. The European Parliament news 
service reported the following full results of the Parliamentary elections:  
European People‘s Party (EPP)—265 seats 
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)—184 seats 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE)—84 seats 
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)—55 seats  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] A NEW CHAPTER FOR TURKEY AND THE EU 235 
 
 
 
 
far-right candidates dangerously broadened the range of acceptable 
criticism of immigration, Turkey, and Islamic culture in general.
51
 
Numerous fire-brands from ―‗drawbridge parties‘ that want to defend 
national boundaries against alien influences‖ won representation.52 In 
several Member States, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Denmark, Slovakia, and Hungary, far-right and anti-immigrant 
parties were rewarded with seats in the Parliament.
53
 At the same time, 
―governing center-right parties in Germany, France, Italy, and Belgium 
advanc[ed] along with center-right opposition groups in Britain and 
Spain.‖54 The center-left parties, considered more ―‗Turkey friendly‘ . . . 
had a humiliating defeat[.]‖55 In the middle of today‘s widespread 
discontent over the economic crisis, conventional wisdom would expect 
voters to turn to Europe‘s traditionally strong left.56 Considering the 
results, factors such as hostility toward immigrants and other outsiders 
appear to have exerted more force.  
In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy‘s center-right Union pour un 
Mouvement Populaire (―UMP‖) party pushed the anti-Turkish accession 
theme as to insist ―that its leading candidates issue formal declarations 
promising not to let Turkey in.‖57 Sarkozy has remarked that Turkey does 
 
 
European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR)—54 seats 
Confederal Group of the European United Left—Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)—35 seats 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD)—32 seats 
Non-affiliated—27 seats 
Seats by Political Group in Each Member State, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliamemnt/archive/ 
elections2009/en/seats_by_group_en.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 51. See Michael Steen, Dutch Shift to Right Unsettles Mainstream Parties, FIN. TIMES (London), 
June 5, 2009, at 8. ―When we started saying those things they threatened to turn off our microphones 
in parliament. Now you hear Prime Minister Balkenende saying it.‖ Id. 
 52. Swing Low, Swing Right, ECONOMIST, June 11, 2009, at 53. 
 53. Voters Steer Europe to the Right, BBC NEWS, June 8, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
europe/8088309.stm. 
 54. Stephen Castle & Alan Cowell, Center-Right Parties Gain in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/world/europe/09europe.html. 
 55. Anti-Turkey Sentiment Gaining Ground in European Parliament, June 9, 2009, TODAY‘S 
ZAHAN, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=177522&bolum=102. 
Some center-right parties oppose Turkey‘s full membership in the EU and favor instead a form of 
special privileged partnership. ―Turkey could find it increasingly hard to find ears willing to listen in 
Brussels.‖ Id. 
 56. ―[T]he most striking feature of the elections was the failure of socialists or centre-left parties 
in four of Europe‘s six largest countries . . . to persuade voters that the global financial crisis and 
recession represented a ‗crisis of capitalism‘ that justified a turn to the left.‖ Tony Barber, Europe’s 
Centre-Right Celebrates Resounding Victory, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ 
3beed410-5368-11de-be08-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=a0a64c2e-39. 
 57. Ben Hall, Turkish Accession Adds Spark to French Election, FIN. TIMES (London), May 23, 
2009, at 3. 
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not have the ―vocation‖ to join the EU, but rather should be granted a 
―privileged partnership‖ along with other countries such as Russia.58 
Sarkozy has flatly stated: ―I do not believe Turkey has a place in the 
European Union.‖59 One UMP activist was quoted as saying: ―Turkey is 
an issue that truly unites us.‖60 He joined with German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel in emphasizing ―the need to define the borders of Europe (i.e., 
keep Turkey out).‖61 Sarkozy‘s party prospered at the polls, electing 
twenty-nine Members of the European Parliament (―MEPs‖)62 and 
increasing its vote share by twelve percent over that in 2004.
63
 Merkel‘s 
party won even more with forty-two seats.
64
 
But news of fringe parties‘ successes was even more dramatic. In the 
civilized, tolerant, EU-founding Member State of the Netherlands, ―Dutch 
voters . . . delivered a solid bloc for anti-immigration politician Geert 
Wilders to take to Europe‘s parliament.‖65 In its first time entering an EU 
election, ―Dutch far-right and anti-Islamist . . . Party for Freedom came 
second with 17 percent of the vote, winning four seats in the assembly.‖66 
Concerns for Muslim immigration and skepticism over Turkey‘s 
aspiration to join the EU were reported as motivating issues.
67
 Wilder‘s 
―Party for Freedom‖ won four of the twenty-five Dutch seats with a 
platform ―to reduce European Union influence, curb immigration and 
reject Turkey‘s membership in the bloc.‖68 Also, among the Party for 
 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Vincent Boland, George Parker & John Thornhill, Paris Balks at Eurozone, FIN. TIMES 
(London), June 26, 2007, at 7.  
 60. Ben Hall, Enthusiasm Towards EU Sours into Cynicism, FIN. TIMES (ASIA EDITION) 
(London), June 2, 2009, at 2. 
 61. Charlemagne, The Endless Election Round, ECONOMIST, June 13, 2009, at 58. 
 62. Results of the 2009 European Parliament Elections, supra note 49. 
 63. Stephen Castle et al., Disaffection Dominates European Parliament Voting, N.Y. TIMES, June 
8, 2009, at A5.  
 64. European Election Results 2009 for Germany, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/ 
archive/elections2009/en/germany_en.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). ―The Christian Democratic 
Union and their Bavaria Christian Social Union sister party got 37.9 percent, according to results 
reported by Deutsche Presse-Agentur.‖ Brian Parkin, Germany’s Merkel Wins EU Vote Seen as 
National Election Test, BLOOMBERG, June 8, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601100&sid=a9q6nqCPrXBI&refer=germany. Subsequent general elections in September 2009 in 
Germany produced a further victory for Merkel and eliminated the center-left SPD from the grand 
coalition, thus strengthening anti-Turkish sentiment in the government. Tony Barber, Berlin Set to 
Harden Stance on Turkey, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2009, http://www.journalisted.com/article?id= 
1872355&sim_showall=yes (follow ―Berlin set to harden stance on Turkey‖ hyperlink). 
 65. Germany’s Dutch Hard-Right Party Scores Win in Europe Elections, REUTERS, June 4, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5536M020090604. 
 66. EU Election Marathon Enters Final Straight, EU BUSINESS NEWS, June 7, 2009, http://www. 
eubusiness.com/news-eu/1244339354.59/. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Jurjen van de Pol, Dutch Put Anti-Immigration Party in EU Parliament, BLOOMBERG, June 
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Freedom‘s goals are banning the Koran and expelling Romania and 
Bulgaria from the EU.
69
 
Other successful parties in the Dutch election had campaigned in favor 
of the EU, suggesting that anti-immigration and anti-Turkey accession 
were key to the result.
70
 That the xenophobic messages were gaining 
respectability, not to mention popularity, bodes poorly for the future 
discussion on Turkey‘s accession.71 For such a new and right-wing party 
to win seats in the European Parliament constitutes ―a political 
earthquake.‖72 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the unbelievable ―white-only British 
National Party‖ (―BNP‖)73 won two seats in the European Parliament with 
a platform that included flatly reactionary positions. BNP leader Nick 
Griffin has made his Islamophobia unambiguous: ―[W]e most definitely, 
and above all else, oppose [the EU‘s] expansion to bring in 80 million 
low-wage Muslims into Christian democratic Europe.‖74 The BNP 
Constitution sets on paper its purpose and restricts its membership to 
protecting the 
interests of the indigenous Anglo-Saxon, Celtic and Norse folk 
communities of Britain and those we regard as closely related and 
ethnically assimilated or assimilable aboriginal members of the 
European race also resident in Britain. Membership of the BNP is 
strictly defined within the terms of, and our members also self-
define themselves within, the legal ambit of a defined ‗racial group‘ 
this being ‗Indigenous Caucasian‘ and defined ‗ethnic groups‘ 
emanating from that Race as specified in law in the House of Lords 
case of Mandla v. Dowell Lee (1983) 1 ALL ER 1062, HL.
75 
 
 
5, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=arwd8D.6rQpQ#. ―People are fed 
up with a large Europe as it is now and with Turkey possibly joining.‖ Id. (quoting Geert Wilders). 
 69. Swing Low, Swing Right, supra note 52, at 17.  
 70. Steen, supra note 51. 
 71. Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was quoted in June 2009: ―When I walk down the 
streets of Milan and I see the large numbers of non-Italians, I feel like [I] am no longer an Italian or in 
a European city but in an African one.‖ Immigration Big Issue in EU Election in Italy, EURONEWS, 
June 6, 2009, http://www.euronews.net/2009/06/06/immigration-big-issue-in-eu-election-in-italy/. 
 72. Steen, supra note 51. 
 73. Doug Saunders, Angry Europe Embraces the Fringe, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), June 9, 2009, 
at A1. The BNP ―forbids blacks from being members and calls for the ‗voluntary‘ repatriation of 
anyone descended from immigrants.‖ Id. 
 74. BNP Makes Scottish Euro Poll Push, BBC NEWS, May 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
uk_news/politics/8043831.stm. 
 75. B.N.P. Const. 2009, § 2(1), available at http://bnp.org.uk/Constitution%209th%20Ed%20 
Sep%202005.pdf. 
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Griffin has written and uttered some frightening statements, 
reminiscent of 1930s fascism. For example in 1995, he attributed his 
party‘s electoral appeal to his constituents‘ perception that the BNP was 
―‗a strong, disciplined organisation with the ability to back up its slogan 
‗Defend the Rights for Whites‘ with well-directed boots and fists. When 
the crunch comes power is the product of force and will, not of rational 
debate.‘‖76 Later in more commercially packaged remarks, he said:  
―[W]e tried to simplify [the BNP‘s] message in some ways and to 
make it a saleable message. So it‘s not white supremacy or racial 
civil war or anything like that, which is what we know in fact is 
going on, and we‘re not supremacists, we‘re white survivalists, even 
that frightens people. Four apple pie words, freedom, security, 
identity and democracy.‖77 
After the June 2009 Parliamentary election, the party was challenged 
by the British government‘s Equality and Human Rights Commission for 
possibly having violated the UK‘s Race Relations Act with its constitution 
and membership criteria.
78
 
That radical political statements may be uttered is, of course, not the 
problem in a liberal democracy; that they be promoted—even financed 
with public funds—as a part of credible political debate and civil discourse 
is, however, troubling. With two seats in the European Parliament, the 
BNP ―will receive much-needed financing and a higher profile as 
broadcasters feel obliged to invite its leaders to more television talk 
shows.‖79 The far-right MEPs from various countries may have enough in 
their numbers now to form a separate political group recognized by 
European Parliament rules, giving them ―access to significant funds and 
the right to chair or steer committees.‖80 The potential validation of their 
views through media repetition and apparent political acceptance can 
threaten responsible civic discussion. The existing public hostility toward 
Turkey causes reluctance in politicians to advocate to the contrary, and 
timid political leadership on the issue ―leaves the field wide open to the 
 
 
 76. BNP: Under the Skin, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/ 
programmes/2001/bnp_special/the_leader/beliefs.stm (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 77. Id. See also B.N.P Const. 2009. 
 78. Rosa Prince, BNP Ordered to Accept Ethnic Minority Members or Face Prosecution, 
TELEGRAPH, June 23, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/5611876/BNP-
ordered-to-accept-ethnic-minority-members-or-face-prosecution.html. 
 79. Stephen Castle, A Rightist Harnesses British Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2009, at A6. 
 80. Posting of Hugo Brady to Centre for European Reform Blog, http://centrefor 
europeanreform.blogspot.com/2009/06/eu-politics-after-elections.html (June 10, 2009, 12:36). 
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opponents of Turkish accession.‖81 With France‘s open opposition to 
Turkish accession and German Chancellor Angela Merkel‘s preference for 
a privileged partnership, there is ―no chance of [the EU] making a robust 
restatement of Europe‘s commitment to Turkey‘s membership.‖82 When 
France vetoed opening negotiations on the acquis chapter addressing 
economic and monetary union, other EU leaders ―shuffled their feet and 
talked nervously in response, but did nothing.‖83 
As referenced above, more than one EU Member State continues to 
veto further accession negotiations for Turkey, slowing any momentum 
that had been generated in favor of Turkey‘s admission. This retardation 
permits the political discussion to accelerate its descent to lower levels of 
racist and xenophobic attacks, as witnessed in the recent European 
Parliament campaigns. All combined, these events allow the anti-Turkey 
cause to gain respectability and support sufficient to dim prospects for the 
success of Turkey‘s EU aspirations. 
[I]f key political players continue to debate and challenge [Turkey‘s 
accession], and act obstructively where they can, and if these 
debates are not resolved, this could become the most contested 
enlargement the EU has seen.   
 . . . . 
 If momentum slows or too many disagreements surface, then 
opponents of the process both in Turkey and in the EU, will be there 
ready to exploit the situation.
84
 
The Parliamentary election yielded similar xenophobic results in 
Austria, where another far-right Freedom Party scored well. ―[T]he big 
winner was [Austria‘s] rightist Freedom Party, which more than doubled 
its strength over the 2004 elections to 13.1 percent of the vote. It 
campaigned on an anti-Islam platform.‖85 A campaign poster for the 
Freedom Party proclaimed ―‗Abendland in Christenhand‘—or Europe in 
Christian hands—the implication being that the EU has allowed too many 
 
 
 81. BARYSCH, supra note 2, at 1. 
 82. Hughes, supra note 1, at 6. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Hughes, supra note 6, at 68, 84. 
 85. Constant Brand & Robert Wielaard, Conservatives Score Wins in EU Parliament Voting, 
HUFFINGTON POST, June 7, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/07/eu-parliament-election-
re_n_212354.html. See also TURKS IN EUROPE: CULTURE, IDENTITY AND INTEGRATION 124–27 (Talip 
Küçükcan & Veyis Güngör eds., 2009) (examples of FPO propaganda directed toward Turks). 
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Muslims to enter Europe,‖86 while a newspaper advertisement proclaimed 
the party‘s vow to veto Turkish EU membership.87 Andreas Moelzer, lead 
candidate for the Freedom Party, was reported recently as campaigning 
with the message: ―[W]e are very strong opponents of Islam.‖88 The 
Freedom Party earned the votes to send two MEPs to the new European 
Parliament.
89
 
Austria has publicly called for Turkey to continue reforms and achieve 
a close partnership with the EU, perhaps ―a tailor-made Turkey-European 
Union community,‖ but not full membership in the EU itself.90 Austria has 
become a staunch proponent of the privileged partnership, while 
remaining the most opposed to accession of any EU Member State, due to 
fierce historical memories of the Turkish sieges combined with strong 
negative reactions to the sizeable Turkish immigrant minority in its 
communities.
91
 Many cite cultural differences to explain their opposition 
to the accession, complaining that Austria‘s 200,000 Turkish immigrants 
have not integrated well.
92
 
Austria‘s neighbor just down the Danube, Hungary, experienced a 
similar turn to the far-right, electing three of its twenty-two MEPs from 
the far-right Jobbik party, which ―describes itself as Euro-skeptic and anti-
immigration . . . . Critics say the party is racist and anti-Semitic.‖93 Jobbik, 
frighteningly, boasts a ―civil defence‖ militia, called the Hungarian 
Guard.
94
 Hungarian voters gave the center-right Fidesz-KDNP party and 
the Jobbik party 71% of the overall vote.
95
 Announcements soon followed 
the election that the Jobbik party plans to ―set up a new political bloc in 
co-operation with the BNP. The BNP confirmed this move, and said it was 
also exploring tie-ups with Jean-Marie Le Pen‘s Front Nationale in 
 
 
 86. Far-Right Party Throws Austria Politics into Turmoil Ahead of EU Elections, DEUTSCHE 
WELLE, June 1, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4295724,00.html.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Jonny Dymond, In Search of Europe: Austria, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2009, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/europe/8073207.stm. Andreas Moelzer of the Freedom Party insists that their anti-Islam 
stance is not a religious concern, but a cultural one. Id. 
 89. European Election Results 2009 for Austria, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/ 
archive/elections2009/en/austria_en.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 90. EU Plans New Accession Negotiations with Turkey at Critical Time, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Apr. 
21, 2006, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3281206,00.html. Sarkozy and Merkel likewise 
favor less than full membership for Turkey such as a ―privileged partnership.‖ Id. at 3. 
 91. Grigoriadis, supra note 8, at 154, 159 n.39. 
 92. BARYSCH, supra note 2, at 4. 
 93. Brand & Wielaard, supra note 85. 
 94. Swing Low, Swing Right, supra note 52, at 53. 
 95. European Election Results 2009 for Hungary, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/ 
archive/elections2009/en/hungary_en.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
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France, Austria‘s Freedom Party and Vlaams Belang of Flanders.‖96 Such 
cross-nurturing can only strengthen these parties‘ notoriety and credibility. 
In Slovakia, Hungary and Austria‘s neighbor to the north and east, ―the 
far-right Slovak National Party won a seat for the first time.‖97 In Finland, 
another anti-immigrant party, the True Finns, won a seat.
98
 There, again, 
voters migrated from the center-left Social Democrats to the populist True 
Finns.
99
 
In Italy, ―the Northern League, known for its anti-immigrant rhetoric, 
made gains with a projected 10 percent of the vote‖100 and won eight 
seats.
101
 Writing in Corriere della Sera, the political commentator 
Massimo Franco said the rise in support for the Northern League 
―legitimises a politics that is shared by xenophobic forces that are on the 
rise nearly everywhere, especially in Holland and Austria.‖102 As 
editorialists at The Economist observed, ―Attacks on immigration and 
minorities slide too easily into xenophobia, racism and homophobia. 
Extremist parties across Europe must be resisted because they are a danger 
not just to the EU but to basic civil liberties.‖103 
In addition to this recent voter swing, a final Member State, the 
Republic of Cyprus, needs no elections to bolster its public opposition to 
Turkish accession. Seventy-two percent of Greek Cypriots polled in 
March 2009 opposed Turkish membership in the EU.
104
 
It is evident that the ensuing debate over Turkey‘s EU negotiations and 
ultimate accession is ratcheting to a more strident and xenophobic tone 
and substance. Turkey‘s advocates in the European Parliament face a 
formidable and seemingly unattainable task. 
The frustrating disconnect between the EU leaders‘ public expressions 
of hope for Turkish accession and the reality of the public‘s discomfort 
with it may be explained by a recent commentator‘s observation:  
 
 
 96. Boland et al., supra note 44. 
 97. Judy Dempsey, For East Europeans, E.U. Election Was a Big Yawn, INT‘L HERALD TRIB., 
June 10, 2009, at 2. See European Election Results 2009 for Slovakia, http://www.europarl.europa. 
eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/slovakia_en.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 98. Swing Low, Swing Right, supra note 52, at 53. See also note 50 and accompanying text. 
 99. True Finns and Greens Triumph in Finnish EU Vote, HELSINKI TIMES, June 11, 2009, 
http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes/helsinki/our-location/156-our-location/6712-true-finns-and-greens-
triumph-in-finnish-eu-vote.html. ―The True Finns‘ leader Timo Soini emerged the overwhelming 
victor in the Finnish EU vote, earning the support of more than 130,000 Finns.‖ Id. 
 100. Castle et al., supra note 63, at A5. 
 101. Saunders, supra note 73, at A1. 
 102. Boland et al., supra note 44, at 6. 
 103. Trouble at the Polls, supra note 50, at 15. 
 104. Greek Cypriots Oppose Full EU Membership for Turkey, EU BUSINESS NEWS, Mar. 18, 
2009, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1237391222.85.  
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Europe does not want to alienate Turkey, but it does not want the 
country to join the EU either. Old biases and prejudices still abound 
in Western Europe, and new ones have been added to the list. 
Political parties are becoming big, and will become even bigger in 
the years ahead, by being anti-immigrant, anti-Turk, and anti-
Turkey. . . . When European citizens are asked whether they want 
Turkey to join the EU, a vast majority says ‗no.‘ There is literally 
no chance whatsoever of them accepting Turkey as a full member of 
the EU.
105
 
At a May 2009 conference of European conservatives, both Merkel and 
Sarkozy again provoked Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan‘s anger by 
asserting their preference for the ―privileged partnership,‖ causing him to 
lash out:  
―I read both of the leaders‘ statements as unfortunate. I‘m a person 
who believes in honesty in politics. I‘m a person who believes that 
there is need for standing behind whatever is said during bilateral, 
tête-á-tête meetings. 
 . . . ―‗The game has started, we‘re playing and the penalty rules 
are changing during the match.‘ It‘s not acceptable; people will 
laugh at you.‖106 
The Turkish press expressed widespread dismay at the statements, 
which had been made by the two EU leaders during a young CDU 
(Christian-Democrats) activists' event. The Daily Milliyet, a Turkish 
newspaper, wrote that ―Merkel has officially shocked Turkey.‖107 
Subsequently, Erdogan said these negative attitudes have led to a ―serious 
erosion in public enthusiasm and public consensus‖ for Turkey‘s 
accession.
108
 Erdogan directly condemned politicians using the anti-
Turkey theme to gain populist support in the June parliamentary election, 
and he ruled out a ―privileged partnership‖ because ―it is impossible for us 
 
 
 105. Galien, supra note 13, at 11. 
 106. Scholars Condemn Alternatives to Turkey’s EU Entry, EURACTIV, May 20, 2009, http:// 
www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/scholars-condemn-alternatives-turkey-eu-entry/article-182513. 
 107. Turkey Shocked by Franco-German Election Rhetoric, EURACTIV, May 11, 2009, http:// 
www.euractiv.com/en/eu-elections/turkey-shocked-franco-german-election-rhetoric/article-182187 (citing 
DAILY MILLIYET). 
 108. PM Erdogan Slams European Union over Turkey’s Accession Bid, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS, 
June 22, 2009, http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=11918914. Respected journalists had 
already reported the decline in 2007: ―Ankara‘s prospects of joining the EU have dwindled to the 
extent that they are seldom mentioned in Turkish political debate . . . .‖ Boland, Parker & Thornhill, 
supra note 59, at 7. 
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to accept a type of membership that does not exist in the EU aquis.‖109 At 
another 2009 conference with a different audience, several Turkish 
scholars insisted that the ―privileged partnership‖ alternative would be 
impossible for Turkey and would provide little incentive for further 
government initiatives.
110
 Current Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet 
Davutoglu, agreed that any alternative to full membership would be 
unacceptable.
111
 
The opposition to Turkey‘s accession, thus, can now be heard from the 
heads of state or government of several EU Member States, most notably 
of EU leaders Germany and France; it will be heard from a strengthened 
center-right-oriented European Parliament; and it will be heard even more 
loudly from the strident calls of far-right wing political leaders—all of 
which together causes a short circuit in the logic of the discussion or, in 
some cases, simply degrades it to a vitriolic potion of racism, xenophobia, 
Islamophobia, and the more narrow Turkophobia.
 
The present political 
discussion is now pre-determined; more could be gained by redirecting the 
dialogue toward a productive end. 
III. TOO MANY VETOES 
[The negotiating process] sometimes seems hollow and adrift. The 
dry give-and-take in conference halls in Brussels masks bigger 
issues about Europe and diversity, Islam and democracy, and ties 
between modern and developing nations. 
—Christopher Torchia & Robert Wielaard, EU and Turkey: Still 
Talking Membership, Barely
112
 
After agreeing unanimously in 2004 to open the accession negotiations 
with Turkey,
113
 Member States have used the negotiation veto, described 
above, in several settings and for diverse reasons to slow or stop the 
accession negotiation progress. Since the actual negotiations began in 
 
 
 109. Tony Barber, Erdogan Hits Out at Efforts to Derail Turkey’s EU Entry, FIN. TIMES, June 27, 
2009, at 2. 
 110. Scholars Condemn Alternatives to Turkey’s EU Entry, supra note 106. 
 111. Turkey Shocked by Franco-German Election Rhetoric, supra note 107. 
 112. Christopher Torchia & Robert Wielaard, EU and Turkey: Still Talking Membership, Barely, 
ABC NEWS, June 29, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7956144. 
 113. On Friday, December 17, 2004, at its Brussels summit, the European Council agreed to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey, starting on October 3, 2005. ANTHONY COMFORT, DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL EXTERNAL POLICIES, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT POLICY DEPARTMENT, TURKEY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE RECOGNITION OF CYPRUS, 3 (2005), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/nt/553/553930/553930en.pdf. 
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October 2005, Turkey was allowed to open talks on only eleven of the 
thirty-five chapters of the acquis,
114
 and a suspension has been imposed on 
officially concluding and closing any chapters at all.
115
 Because every 
Member State must approve the opening and closing of negotiations on 
each of the thirty-five chapters,
116
 the potential for obstruction is immense. 
The events unfolding in 2009 fortify the forces opposing Turkey and 
amplify their opportunity to make permanent the blockage of Turkey‘s 
accession. 
Thus far, the negotiation veto history reveals the following. From the 
discussions on the first chapters of negotiations in June 2006, the 
government of the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus has shown its 
willingness to halt the process if Turkey fails to accede to its demands.
117
 
When Turkey and European Union officials attempted to open and 
routinely close the first and uncontroversial Chapter Twenty-five on 
Science and Research, which in fact contains little EU law on the subjects, 
Cyprus refused to conclude the narrow negotiations
118
 and demanded that 
the EU require Turkey to normalize relations with Cyprus and extend 
 
 
 114. On June 30, 2009, the eleventh chapter, which concerns taxation, was opened in Brussels. 
Turkey Opens Taxation Chapter, Urges EU to Play the Game by Its Rules, HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS, 
June 30, 2009, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/11974579.asp?gid=244. The eleven chapters 
include:  
Chapter 4—Free movement of capital,  
Chapter 6—Company law,  
Chapter 7—Intellectual property rights,  
Chapter 10—Information society and media,  
Chapter 16—Taxation,  
Chapter 18—Statistics,  
Chapter 20—Enterprise and industrial policy,  
Chapter 21—Trans-European networks,  
Chapter 28—Consumer and health protection, and  
Chapter 32—Financial control.  
William Chislett, Turkey’s EU Accession Reaches an Impasse 26 app. at 27 (Real Instituto Elcono, 
Working Paper No. 34/2009, 2009), available at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/ 
rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/dt34-2009 (follow 
―Download PDF‖ hyperlink). 
 115. Press Release, 2770th Council Meeting, General Affairs (Turkey must fulfill commitments to 
the Protocol before chapters are provisionally closed.) (Dec. 11, 2006), available at http://www. 
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/92122.pdf; Presidency Conclusions, 
Brussels European Council (Feb. 12, 2007) (endorsing the conclusions stated at the 2770th Council 
Meeting). 
 116. Beunderman, supra note 39. 
 117. Daniel Dombey, George Parker & Vincent Boland, Cyprus Stance Threatens Turkish EU 
Talks, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 2006, at 5. 
 118. EU Entry for Turkey Faces a Test, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/06/11/world/europe/11iht-cyprus.1947796.html?_r=1. 
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Customs Union treatment to it.
119
 As is illustrated below, this demand is 
not as simple as it may seem.  
Just months later, in December 2006, the Republic of Cyprus again 
pushed the EU to block the negotiations further, asserting that European 
Commission recommendations were not strong enough against Turkey.
120
 
In the run up to the Council meeting regarding the issue, Cyprus 
―threatened to continue blocking all new negotiations‖ because the 
Commission proposal for a moderate sanction did not place enough 
pressure on Turkey.
121
 Days later, the EU General Affairs Council resisted 
exceeding the already powerful Commission recommendation, and it 
issued the formal decision to block the eight negotiation chapters related to 
the EU-Turkey customs union,
122
 and refused official closing of any 
chapter at all until Turkey extended customs union treatment to the Greek 
Cypriots.
123
 Cyprus Government spokesperson, Christodoulos Pasiardis, 
declared just before the decision was taken that Cyprus would ―continue 
and intensify its efforts in cooperation with the other member states so that 
the European Union‘s final decisions [on Turkey‘s continued negotiations] 
 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Cyprus Ready to Block Ankara EU Talks: Tassos Not Satisfied with Commission’s Stance 
Toward Turkey, CYPRUS WEEKLY, Dec. 1, 2006, http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org/press/press2006/ 
cywe_011206_readytoblock.htm. Cyprus, Austria, and Greece argued for a definite date to be set for 
Turkey to recognize Cyprus, but other countries pressed for moderation, as well as for sending some 
positive signals such as lifting the isolation of the TRNC. HR-Net, Cyprus PIO: Turkish Press and 
Other Media, 06-12-12, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2006/06-12-12.tcpr.html#01 (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2009). 
 121. Paul Taylor, Some EU States Seek Tougher Steps Against Turkey, SUNDAY MAIL OF 
NICOSIA, Dec. 3, 2006, http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org (follow ―Media Watch‖ hyperlink; then follow 
―2006‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Some EU states seek tougher steps against Turkey‖ hyperlink). 
Greece, Portugal, and Germany also expressed concern that a date be set for Turkey‘s compliance. Id. 
 122. ―Cyprus is holding out on some, as is the European Commission, which supervises the 
accession process.‖ Amelie Bottollier-Depois, Turkey Takes Tiny EU Membership Step, EU BUSINESS 
NEWS, June 17, 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1213693321.78. 
 123. CHALMERS & MONTI, supra note 45, at 16. The eight areas include:  
Chapter 1—Free Movement of Goods,  
Chapter 3—Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services,  
Chapter 9—Financial Services,  
Chapter 11—Agriculture and Rural Development,   
Chapter 13—Fisheries,  
Chapter 14—Transport Policy,  
Chapter 29—Customs Union, and  
Chapter 30—External Relations.  
Press Release, 2770th Council Meeting, supra note 115, at 9. As the Commission‘s most recent 
Progress Report reveals, efforts toward satisfying the acquis continue in spite of the vetoes and refusal 
to open or close the chapters. See Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 4, passim. 
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can be strict and effective.‖124 At that time, then French Presidential 
candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, joined the Cypriot call to suspend the talks.
125
 
Subsequently in 2007, Sarkozy-led France, plainly on the record 
opposing Turkish accession, blocked the opening of an additional five 
chapters directly related to full accession.
126
 When France vetoed opening 
the chapter on economic and monetary union, officials cited technical 
reasons, but it was clear to observers that France‘s political opposition to 
Turkish EU membership was the underlying reason.
127
 The other chapter 
negotiations that are proceeding ―have done so at a snail‘s pace.‖128 Pro-
Turkey Sweden, which held the EU presidency from July 1 to December 
31, 2009, feared that not a single new chapter will be opened in its term, 
enhancing ―the specter of a standstill in [the] talks.‖129 Facing opposition 
from so many EU leaders and substantial political groups, Turkey‘s path 
to accession is more difficult than ever. So the road to accession faces 
multiple Member State vetoes and delays from different directions. 
The vetoes are particularly problematic because they arise out of two 
different, but equally intractable, conflicts. Cyprus and the EU are 
blocking the eight chapter negotiations for the stated, official reason of 
requiring Turkey to grant the Republic of Cyprus full customs union 
access to Turkey‘s markets, ports, and airports, a patent obligation under 
the Turkey-EU Accession Agreement, and the special Additional Protocol 
requiring formal recognition of all Member States.
130
 However, what 
would appear to be a clear obligation of accession actually is not simple at 
all, and the application of customs union recognition by Turkey presents a 
highly emotional and politically-charged diplomatic conundrum. Turkey 
resists granting the Republic of Cyprus full recognition until general 
agreement is reached to resolve the divided status of the island,
131
 or at 
least until the ―crippling international embargo on the Turkish Cypriot 
state is lifted,‖132 and ―until the EU fulfill[s] a pledge to end the economic 
 
 
 124. Cyprus Threatens to Veto Turkey Talks, EURACTIV, June 1, 2007, http://www.euractiv.com/ 
en/enlargement/cyprus-threatens-veto-turkey-talks/article-160171#. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Bottollier-Depois, supra note 122. France opposed opening chapters 11 (agriculture and rural 
affairs), 17 (economic and monetary policy), 22 (regional policy and coordination of structural funds), 
33 (financial and budgetary provisions), and 34 (institutions). Chislett, supra note 114, at 28. 
 127. Setback for Turkey as France Vetoes Economic Accession Talks, EURO INTELLIGENCE, June 
26, 2007, http://www.eurointelligence.com/Article3.1018+M5cb5e73e916.0.html. 
 128. CHALMERS & MONTI, supra note 45, at 16. 
 129. Villelabeitia, supra note 48. 
 130. Press Release, 2770th Council Meeting, supra note 115, at 8 (referring specifically to the 
Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement). 
 131. COMFORT, supra note 113, at 4. 
 132. EU Entry for Turkey Faces a Test, supra note 118. See also Dombey, Parker & Boland, 
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isolation of northern Cyprus, a move the internationally recognised Greek 
Cypriot government in Nicosia has blocked.‖133 Recognition of Cyprus 
might imply de-recognition of the TRNC, and Turkey insists that the 
present government of Cyprus does not represent the minority Turkish 
Cypriots.
134
 Turkey is also reluctant to yield to what it perceived as Greek 
Cypriot deceitful double-dealing in 2004, which undermined efforts to 
resolve the island‘s division.135 Cyprus, for its part, has remained 
intransigent on this issue, partially trying to gain leverage in the ongoing 
reunification talks for the split island.
136
 Despite the fact that Nicosia, the 
capital of Cyprus, has been a divided city longer than Berlin was,
137
 recent 
events described herein make the island‘s reunification less likely than in 
recent years, and Turkey seems unlikely to stand down in the face of the 
Greek Cypriot hard line.
138
 
France proffers an even more profound reason for its vetoes: because 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy ―prefers a ‗privileged partnership,‘ he 
argues that Turkey need not bother with those chapters of the acquis that 
are only relevant for full members.‖139 Sarkozy, as articulated supra, 
objects to Turkey‘s fundamental lack of a European vocation, and he 
insists that Turkey simply does not belong in the EU.
140
 In 2007, when 
France vetoed negotiations on the economic and monetary union chapter, 
Sarkozy stated unequivocally: ―I do not believe Turkey has a place in the 
European Union.‖141 This more abstract and philosophical objection 
appears even less likely to be resolved than the difficult Cyprus issue. 
With the remaining halted chapters essentially dependent on the Cyprus 
issue, the prospect for successful completion of the accession negotiation 
 
 
supra note 117. Turkey refuses ―to move on Greek Cypriot demands without a lifting of the economic 
and political isolation of the small Turkish community on the divided island.‖ Id. 
 133. Mark Tran, EU-Minded Ankara Offers Concession on Cyprus, GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/dec/07/cyprus.turkey. ―Nicosia continues to oppose EU efforts 
to establish direct trade and economic links to the north of the island.‖ Id. 
 134. COMFORT, supra note 113. 
 135. See Seale, supra note 34. 
 136. Barysch, supra note 15.  
 137. The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?, CENTER FOR EUR. POL‘Y STUD., Dec. 2, 2006, 
http://old.ceps.eu/Article.php?article_id=524 (summary of presentation proceedings of Cyprus report 
by Dr. Nicholas Whyte, Europe Programme Director, Int‘l Crisis Group). 
 138. Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Cicek ―stressed that Turkey would not make any 
concessions on Cyprus in exchange for progress in its bid to join the European Union. ‗Turkey will 
never be dragged into a deadend of choosing between Cyprus and the EU.‘‖ Odul Asik Ulker, Return 
of Turkish Cypriot Nationalists Raises Peace Fears, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 20, 2009, 4/20/09 
AGFRP 10:11:00 (Westlaw). 
 139. Barysch, supra note 15. 
 140. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 141. Boland, Parker & Thornhill, supra note 59, at 7. 
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degenerates. Moreover, Austria, a leading opponent of Turkey‘s accession 
is seen as hiding behind the Cyprus issue.
142
 The European Commission 
reported flatly in 2008 that Turkey had ―made no progress towards fully 
implementing the Additional Protocol,‖ and ―no progress on normalising 
bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus.‖143 With a new 
Commission review of Turkey‘s compliance with the Ankara Protocol due 
in December 2009, compliance with which is highly doubtful,
144
 ―[s]ome 
EU governments will insist that Turkey‘s accession process will be put on 
hold. Even if there were no such demands, there are now so many bilateral 
vetoes . . . that the EU would simply run out of chapters to negotiate with 
Ankara.‖145 
For many centuries, Cyprus‘s history has been filled with suffering and 
foreign exploitation.
146
 But the tragic events of the post-colonial 1960s and 
1970s on Cyprus provide the background that is fundamental to fathoming 
this current root-bound ethnic conflict.
147
 The personal stories of the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots during the island‘s violent break-up poignantly 
portray the degree of loss on both sides.
148
 Turkey‘s resistance to 
extending formal diplomatic recognition to the Greek Cypriot government 
of Cyprus can be understood only in the light of two historic and highly 
controversial events in this era: first, the division of the island of Cyprus in 
the 1960s and 1970s (the outbreak of widespread sectarian violence on 
Cyprus, the Greek nationalist coup attempt, and the subsequent Turkish 
invasion of and refusal to leave the Turkish minority sector of the island), 
and second, thirty years later, the Greek Cypriot government‘s 
overwhelming opposition to and its constituents‘ rejection of the U.N. 
 
 
 142. The Chair of the European Parliament‘s EU-Turkey committee, Dutch MEP Joost Lagendijk, 
has stated that a few countries hide behind the Cyprus issue, such as France and Austria, and he fears 
that if the current negotiations fail, the island could be divided permanently. Interview by Yonca 
Poyraz Doğan with Joost Lagendijk, Chairman, Delegation to the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary 
Committee (Apr. 20, 2009), transcript available at Lagendijk Says Some EU States Hiding Behind 
Cyprus, TODAY‘S ZAMAN, Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load= 
detay& link=172917. 
 143. Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 4, at 28. 
 144. Compliance remains doubtful because of the deadlock between the three principal actors in 
the stalled Cyprus negotiations—the TRNC, the Republic of Cyprus, and Turkey. See infra Part III.B. 
 145. Barysch, supra note 15. 
 146. See, e.g., SIR GEORGE HILL, A HISTORY OF CYPRUS (1949); H. D. PURCELL, CYPRUS (1968). 
 147. For a detailed historical account of this period, see CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, HOSTAGE TO 
HISTORY: CYPRUS FROM THE OTTOMANS TO KISSINGER, passim (1997). 
 148. For a broad survey of the differences of opinion and poignancy of emotions following the 
violence and separations of the 1974 military split of the island, see ARI SITAS, DILEK LATIF & 
NATASA LOIZOU, PRIO CYPRUS CENTRE, REPORT: PROSPECTS OF RECONCILIATION, CO-EXISTENCE 
AND FORGIVENESS IN CYPRUS IN THE POST REFERENDUM PERIOD (2007), http://www.prio.no/files/ 
manual-import/cyprus/1740_Report_4_07.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2010] A NEW CHAPTER FOR TURKEY AND THE EU 249 
 
 
 
 
reunification plan in 2004, just days before the Republic of Cyprus‘s 
accession to the EU. Personal and political developments following these 
two dramatic periods in European history have carved deep scars of 
enmity and distrust, lasting for years, leading to today‘s inscrutable 
deadlock.  
A. The 1963–1974 Breakdown of Cyprus 
Most credible accounts of the island‘s division and of Turkish relations 
with Cyprus since its independence seem careful to adopt a balanced and 
accurate characterization of the fundamental background facts in an effort 
to be fair to all parties about the island‘s division. One U.K. judge, writing 
a judgment recently in the property case, Apostolides v. Orams, took 
explicit efforts to strive for objectivity: 
 The situation with which the court is concerned can only be 
understood in the context of the recent history of Cyprus. I shall set 
it out as briefly as I may and with the intention of avoiding 
controversy. The Republic of Cyprus came into being in 1960 when 
the United Kingdom gave up its sovereignty of the island . . . . The 
constitution of the Republic was intended to provide a balance 
between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. Within 
three years the bi-communal government of the island had 
effectively failed. In March 1964 a United Nations peace keeping 
force, UNICYP, arrived. A Turkish Cypriot administration came 
into being in the area then under Turkish Cypriot control. In July 
1974 there was a coup against the government of the [Republic of 
Cyprus‘s] President, Archbishop Makarios. The aim of the coup 
was to secure union with Greece. On 20 July 1974 the Turkish army 
invaded the north of the island and secured control of the area now 
under the administration of the Turkish Republic.
149
  
Typical journalistic commentary reports the same even-handed 
account, illustrated for example, in this BBC report: ―Cyprus has been 
divided since 1974, when Turkish troops invaded to counter a Greek 
Cypriot coup backed by the military junta ruling Greece at the time.‖150 Or 
 
 
 149. Orams v. Apostolides, [2006] EWHC (QB) 2226, [3] (Eng.) (Jack, J.). 
 150. Cyprus ―May Veto‖ EU-Turkey Talks, BBC NEWS, Nov. 30, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/europe/6160637.stm. ―Cyprus has been divided since 1974 when Turkish troops occupied its 
northern third in response to an Athens-engineered Greek Cypriot coup seeking to unite the island with 
Greece.‖ Cyprus Drops Legal Action Against EU Over Aid to North, EU BUSINESS NEWS, June 3, 
2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1212509822.63. The same view came from Agence France 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
250 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:225 
 
 
 
 
perhaps a little more informative is this characterization by a news source 
focused more narrowly on EU affairs: ―Cyprus gained independence from 
Britain in 1960. Three years later, inter-communal violence broke out 
between the Mediterranean island‘s Greek and Turkish communities, 
which eventually led to a Greek-sponsored attempt in 1974 to seize the 
government and a military intervention by Turkey.‖151  
Most non-partisan academic characterization follows the same 
bipartisan pattern and offers more specifics.
152
 In 1963, after only three 
years as an independent country, the Republic of Cyprus was engulfed in 
general military conflict between the majority Greek Cypriots and the 
minority Turkish Cypriots.
153
 For a while, anarchy prevailed as hundreds 
were killed on both sides.
154
 Villages were destroyed, and thousands of 
people on both sides fled to safer enclaves in their traditional separate 
neighborhoods.
155
 Atrocities sufficient to fuel generations of hatred were 
committed by both sides.
156
 This period, thus, presented dangerous and 
explosive conflict, not simply minor disagreements of the finer niceties of 
constitutional governance. The British, Greek, and Turkish governments, 
which had overseen the launch of Cyprus‘s independence, moved in 
peacekeeping troops, and the now famous ―Green Line‖ was established to 
separate the sides.
157
 The U.N. installed a peacekeeping mission in March 
the next year.
158
 
Through the following ten years, tensions continued, until in 1974, 
Greek military officers leading Cyprus National Guard soldiers staged a 
military coup to depose Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios and 
 
 
Presse: ―Cyprus has been divided since 1974 when Turkey invaded and seized its northern third in 
response to an Athens-engineered Greek Cypriot coup to unite the eastern Mediterranean island with 
Greece.‖ Ulker, supra note 138. 
 151. Turkey Accession and Cyprus, EURACTIV, Jan. 5, 2007, http://www.euractiv.com/en/ 
enlargement/turkey-accession-cyprus/article-135940. 
 152. See, e.g., infra notes 155–57. Partisan writings on both sides, as would be expected, offer 
unbalanced fuel for their constituents. See, e.g., Cyprus Blog, http://greekcypriot.blogspot.com (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2009); Real Facts about the Cyprus Problem, http://www.solution2cyprus.info/?gclid= 
CODA3OXdoJwCFQ UhnAod9REXdA (last visited Oct. 4, 2009) (a pro-TRNC website). 
 153. Patrick R. Hugg, Cyprus in Europe: Seizing the Momentum of Nice, 34 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT‘L L. 1293, 1312 (2001). 
 154. Id. at 1313. 
 155. ANDREW BOROWIEC, CYPRUS: A TROUBLED ISLAND 57–58 (2000). 
 156. PURCELL, supra note 146, at 326–28. 
 157. Tomas Ehrlich, Cyprus, the Warlike Isle: Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis, 18 
STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1044, 1078 (1966). The ―Green Line‖ refers to the cease fire line that runs along 
where, in 1964, British troops laid down barbed wire to separate the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
Chislett, supra note 114, at 18. 
 158. S.C. Res. 186 (XIX), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/186 (Mar. 4, 1964) (Security Council Resolution 
on the Creation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, ―UNFICYP‖). 
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replace him with a leader dedicated to uniting the island with Greece, a 
concept known to the Greeks as enosis.
159
 A U.S. diplomatic evaluation of 
the situation was that Turkey probably viewed the military coup as de 
facto enosis with Greece.
160
 Crisis escalated, and Turkish leaders sought 
Britain‘s aid in protecting the independence of the island, but to little 
avail; poignant was British and American ambivalence, as a divided 
Cyprus was not unattractive to global strategy.
161
 
Fearful that the Greek takeover would be accepted by the global 
powers, Turkey launched its now well-known and often condemned 
military invasion.
162
 ―The U.S., in the lead at this point, expressed regret 
over the invasion, but publicly blamed Greece for the coup, as U.S. and 
British diplomats worked not to reverse the invasion, but to restrain the 
Greeks from going to war with Turkey.‖163 Still in the 1970s Cold War, 
stabilizing the NATO alliance was the overarching concern.
164
 In the next 
year, large-scale population exchanges between the north and south were 
completed under U.N. auspices, with two largely homogeneous ethnic 
zones established.
165
 
All accounts make clear that this explosive era of ethnic conflict in 
Cyprus delivered both personal tragedy and forcible dislocation for too 
many Greek and Turkish Cypriot people. History also makes clear that the 
 
 
 159. Michael N. Schmitt, Aegean Angst: A Historical and Legal Analysis of the Greek-Turkish 
Dispute, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 15, 23 (1996). 
 160. The new President, following the coup, could hardly have been a more inflammatory figure. 
Nicos Sampson was termed by the U.S. Ambassador as an ―out and out gangster, a guerilla type with 
no compunctions against murder and assassination,‖ and called a ―Turk-eater‖ by others; he had been 
convicted of murder in 1957 and led forces against the Turkish Cyrpiots in the 1963–64 
intercommunal violence. JAN ASMUSSSEN, CYPRUS AT WAR 23 (2008). 
 161. BRENDAN O‘MALLEY & IAN CRAIG, THE CYPRUS CONSPIRACY 223 (1999). Criticism of U.S. 
policy in the 1970s emphasized that President Richard Nixon was preoccupied with the Watergate 
crisis, and that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger supported the Greek military junta in power in 
Greece and its policy ―designed to bring about such a crisis.‖ HITCHENS, supra note 147, at 146–51. 
Greek colonels launched a campaign against Markarios in 1970, which turned violent and included 
assassination plots against Markarios and the creation of a terrorist underground to target Markarios 
and others in opposition. Id. at 70–71 
 162. Suzanne Palmer, Note, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus: Should the United States 
Recognize It as an Independent State?, 4 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 423, 438 (1986). Many had expected Turkey 
to invade sooner when two previous coup attempts failed in 1970 and 1971. Olga Demetriou, 
Catalysis, Catachresis: The EU’s Impact on the Cyprus Conflict, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
BORDER CONFLICTS: THE POWER OF INTEGRATION AND ASSOCIATION 64, 69 (T. Diez, M. Albert & S. 
Stetter eds., 2008). 
 163. Hugg, supra note 153, at 1315. 
 164.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93RD CONG., CRISIS ON CYPRUS: 1974: A STUDY 
MISSION REPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS 
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES 44 (Comm. Print 1974). 
 165. David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus, 31 TEX INT‘L L.J. 141, 
171 (1996); S.C. Res. 370 (XXX), Annex, U.N. Doc. S/11789 (Aug. 5, 1975). 
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explosion was not an unprovoked, unilateral aggression of an expansionist 
conqueror from Asia Minor. Yet today this separation is portrayed by 
many as the result of only one event: the Turkish invasion. Myopically, 
the U.N. and EU discourse relating to the island‘s history primarily adopts 
this view and has condemned only Turkey and the TRNC for the island‘s 
division.
166
 The facts belie that simplistic view and show its futility. As the 
Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish government today endeavor to reunite the 
island along U.N. recommendations and open it up for full customs union 
trade on both sides, this extreme, one-sided framing of the fundamental 
issue by the international community causes huge frustrations and natural 
defensive resistances. 
Thirty-five years ago in 1974, the Greek government was directly 
culpable for engineering the military coup to overthrow the democratically 
elected President of Cyprus and to effect enosis with the Greek nation.
167
 
Subsequently that year, Turkey reacted to this government take-over by 
sending in troops to protect the Turkish Cypriots, as well as itself from 
then-hostile Greece annexing an island far closer to Turkey than to Greece. 
Thousands of people fled incoming soldiers on both sides, and population 
transfers took place.
168 
Having no confidence that its Turkish Cypriot 
cousins were safe, Turkey refused to withdraw its troops. Without a U.N. 
plan to insure safety and fair treatment for Turkish Cypriots, Turkey has 
kept its troops in place to this day. Yet from 1974 on, Greece has 
succeeded in obtaining an international commercial embargo around 
northern Cyprus.
169
 Subsequently in 1987 when Turkey responded to that 
embargo by closing its ports to Cypriot ships, the Greek Cypriots 
proclaimed a violation of international law.
170
 Turkey has repeatedly 
 
 
 166. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3395 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3395 (Nov. 20, 1975). There, the U.N. 
called for all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus, 
demands the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the island, and calls for urgent measures to facilitate 
the return of displaced persons. Id. No mention is made of the coup attempt or the plight of minority 
Turkish Cypriots. 
 167. Numerous authoritative sources portray the details of the Greek colonels‘ subversion of the 
Makarios regime. See, e.g., PARKER T. HART, TWO NATO ALLIES AT THE THRESHOLD OF WAR: 
CYPRUS, A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT, 1965–1968, at 129–30 (1990). Greece 
subsequently obstructed EU-Turkish relations immediately upon its entry into the European Economic 
Community in 1981, until it changed strategy eighteen years later at the Helsinki Summit in 1999. 
Grigoriadis, supra note 7, at 148. U.S. support for the Greek military junta during these years is 
likewise well documented. See, e.g., HITCHENS, supra note 148, passim. 
 168. MICHAEL EMERSON, REDRAWING THE MAP OF EUROPE 72 (1998).  
 169. Grigoriadis, supra note 7, at 147. 
 170. Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Illegal Restrictive Measures 
Against Cyprus and European Union Shipping, http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/FE3A0 
CAC00592FC0C225725D002A8441 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
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pledged that its ports would be opened as soon as the Cypriots open those 
in the TRNC.
171
 Stalemate results again. 
The past burdens the future. The two sides of Cyprus view history 
through starkly different lenses:  
Greek Cypriots generally think of the Cyprus problem as having 
started in July 1974. This, of course, is very different from the 
Turkish Cypriots‘ understanding of the problem, which they regard 
as having started in earnest in 1963 with the breakdown of the 
bicommunal ROC government. The Greek Cypriot side tends to 
overlook the conflict that existed between the two communities and 
the dire situation of the Turkish Cypriots before 1974, as well as the 
Greek/Greek Cypriot coup and enosis bid that preceded and 
precipitated the Turkish military operation. Ignoring all this, Greek 
Cypriots cast the problem as one of an arbitrary ‗invasion and 
occupation by the Turkish forces of substantial territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus‘.172 
This contentious cohabitation of Cyprus grew worse in the 2004 run-up 
to the divided island‘s admission to the EU in the midst of laborious U.N. 
efforts to reunite the island. 
B. The 2004 United Nations Peace Plan Referendum 
At the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the EU leaders agreed to admit the 
Republic of Cyprus into the EU in what would become the largest growth 
of the EU ever, as part of the historic 2004 central and eastern European 
enlargement.
173
 In a critical and subsequently criticized decision at the 
Helsinki Summit, the EU leaders agreed to allow Cyprus‘s accession even 
without a resolution of the island‘s division: after welcoming the launch of 
the U.N. settlement talks on Cyprus, the European Council explained ―that 
a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the 
European Union. [But] [i]f no settlement has been reached by the 
completion of accession negotiations, the Council‘s decision on accession 
 
 
 171. Yilmaz, supra note 20, at 21. 
 172. AYLA GÜREL & KUDRET ÖZERSAY, PRIO, THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY IN CYPRUS: 
CONFLICTING APPEALS TO ‗BIZONALITY‘ AND ‗HUMAN RIGHTS‘ BY THE TWO CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES 
22 (2006), http://www.prio.no/upload/Cyprus%20Property%20Report%202%20Trimmed%20(corrected). 
pdf. 
 173. Helsinki European Council, supra note 37. The fifteen current Member States embrace 
thirteen candidate countries ―for the stability and prosperity of the entire European continent.‖ Id. ¶ 3. 
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will be made without the above being a precondition.‖174 Outside 
observers might ask why the EU would allow a militarily-divided state 
membership in the world‘s flagship supranational model of harmony and 
peace, which ―import[s] [a] fierce territorial dispute[] within the EU 
borders—a dispute in which the two sides are protected by separate 
security guarantees from Greece and Turkey.‖175 
The answer is not a secret, and it returns to the fundamental flaw 
inherent in the unanimity requirement and the power of even a solitary 
veto. The EU, negotiating internally to achieve the mandated unanimity 
for agreement on the Treaty of Amsterdam and for the ongoing overall 
eastern enlargement process to continue to proceed forward, yielded to 
demands from Greece that the Republic of Cyprus be allowed into full 
membership, regardless of whether it was united.
176
 Not surprisingly, 
following the EU announcement that the Republic of Cyprus would 
accede, even without a settlement of the division, Cyprus reunification 
negotiations degenerated.
177
 
For Turkey, the positive side of the Greek bargain with the EU was that 
Greece withheld its veto against the EU-Turkey Customs Union, in 
exchange for unquestioned EU entry for the Republic of Cyprus.
178
 The 
Trojan Horse metaphor is simplistic and unfair, but clearly with the Greek 
Cypriot-governed Republic of Cyprus admitted as a full veto-bearing 
Member State in the EU, no Greek could have any doubt whatsoever of 
strong resistance to and heavy demands toward Turkey‘s own subsequent 
admission to the club. 
Nonetheless, following the agreement on the customs union and as 
Turkey was negotiating for an EU final decision agreeing to formally 
name Turkey as an EU accession candidate, the Turkish government 
worked in earnest at home toward the legal reforms needed to satisfy the 
requirements of both the customs union and the acquis. As European 
 
 
 174. Id. ¶ 9(b). See also Kerin Hope, Dramatic Shift in Relations Between Old Enemies, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Dec. 21, 1999, at 1. Part of the deal was also that any failure to reach a solution on 
Cyprus would not be caused by the Greek Cypriots. Demetriou, supra note 162, at 74. 
 175. HARUN ARIKAN, TURKEY AND THE EU: AN AWKWARD CANDIDATE FOR EU MEMBERSHIP? 
191 (2d ed. 2006) (citing Neill Nugent, EU Enlargement and the Cyprus Problem, 38 J. COMMON 
MARKET STUD. 131, 139 (2000)). ―The EU, after all, is meant to be the biggest peace project on earth. 
Sandbags and barbed wire are not what it is about.‖ Helena Smith, Greeks Vote Down Cyprus Unity 
Plan, GUARDIAN, Apr. 25, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/25/cyprus.united nations 
(quoting an EU diplomat based in Nicosia). 
 176. Heinz-Jürgen Axt, The Island of Cyprus and the European Union, in CYPRUS: THE NEED FOR 
NEW PERSPECTIVES 174, 176–77 (Clement Dodd et al. eds., 1999). 
 177. CELEMENT H. DODD, THE CYPRUS IMBROGLIO 102 (1998). 
 178. Axt, supra note 176, at 177. 
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Commission Progress Reports document, Turkey engaged in huge efforts 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s to satisfy the EU and, moreover, to 
promote the reunification of the island of Cyprus.
179
 Herein lies the second 
major source of conflict for the Turks and Turkish-Cypriots toward the 
Republic of Cyprus. As a part of its accession efforts, Turkey also 
followed EU urgings to push the TRNC toward the U.N. peace process.
180
 
Accordingly, Turkey complied by adopting a major policy reversal toward 
the reunification of Cyprus.
181
 An EU warning, ―in no uncertain terms . . . 
accounted for Ankara‘s extraordinary volte-face in the hardline policy it 
ha[d] traditionally pursued over Cyprus.‖182 When Turkey took the 
politically risky step to pressure the TRNC hard in favor of the U.N. 
sponsored reunification plan (the Annan Plan
183
), the intended result from 
the perspective of Turkey and the EU was that this would situate the island 
so that it could accede to the EU as a united polity.
184
 Greece had even 
lobbied the EU that starting Cyprus‘s accession negotiations presented the 
EU‘s only opportunity to promote the U.N.‘s reunification efforts.185 But 
then, to the dismay of EU and Turkish leaders, the government of the 
Republic of Cyprus, ―which had long advocated reunification,‖186 reversed 
its role and launched a strong campaign opposed to the U.N. peace plan. In 
April 2004, the Greek Cypriot government campaigned fiercely against 
the U.N. sponsored Annan Plan to reunite the island, ―unleashing an 
unprecedented wave of nationalism in the island.‖187 EU Enlargement 
Commissioner at the time Günter Verheugen assailed the change of 
position as duplicity, saying that ―the government in the Greek part of 
Cyprus had cheated the EU by pretending to support the unification plan 
while in reality campaigning against it. Mr. Verheugen said the 
 
 
 179. Turkey 2008 Progress Report, supra note 4. 
 180. See, e.g., 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, at 41 COM (2003).  
 181. Turkish Prime Minister ―Erdogan won a lot of sympathy from the international community 
for overturning 30 years of policy and pressing the Turkish-Cypriots to endorse the reunification plan 
in a referendum, which they did with a 65% majority.‖ Chislett, supra note 114, at 17. 
 182. Smith, supra note 175. 
 183. Named after then U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. The Comprehensive Settlement of the 
Cyprus Problem, UNITED NATIONS, Mar. 31, 2004, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/annanplan/annan 
plan.pdf. 
 184. The central thesis was to use EU membership as a catalyst for Cyprus‘s reunification. 
Demetriou, supra note 162, at 65. 
 185. Id. at 73. 
 186. The Cyprus Stalemate, supra note 137. 
 187. Neophytos Loizides & Eser Keskiner, The Aftermath of the Annan Plan Referendums: Cross-
Voting Moderation for Cyprus?, 5 SOUTHEAST EUR. POL. 158, 159–60 (2004). Greek Cypriot 
President Papadopolous urged a ―resounding ‗no‘ to the plan‖ and went ―so far as to brand ‗yes‘ 
supporters as traitors‖ and ―manipulat[ed] . . . state bureaucracy and media against the plan.‖ Id. 
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government ‗had taken him for a ride‘ and he directly criticised the Greek 
Cypriot leader, Tasos Papadopoulos.‖188 U.N. officials were furious that 
their worst fears had materialized.
189
 The surprising rejection called into 
question the founding principle of the U.N. and EU reunification plan to 
adopt a federal solution based on equal treatment of the two 
communities.
190
 Allowing Cyprus to accede to the EU—even without a 
solution to the island‘s division—was based on the clear agreement that 
Cyprus would do all it could to unite the island, and Papadopoulos was to 
respect that part of the deal, said Verheugen.
191
 One scholar observed that 
Cyprus had ill-used the ―EU‘s institutional capacity for reconciliation and 
conflict resolution . . . to gain accession without compromising on a 
solution.‖192 EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten accused the 
Greek Cypriots of being ―guilty of ‗betrayal,‘ by using their support for 
reunification to leverage their way into the EU, only to reverse themselves 
when membership became imminent. ‗They are not going to be a popular 
addition to the family.‘‖193 Naturally, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot 
people reacted similarly, resenting mightily what they (and many other 
leaders) consider was the betrayal of the peace process by Cypriot bad 
faith.
194
 
The unsavory details of the Cypriot obstruction help explain the level 
current of resentment and frustration. The Greek Cypriot government was 
accused of ―manipulating public opinion by restricting the news media and 
having school teachers push a ‗no‘ vote to ensure the failure of . . . [the] 
referendum.‖195 EU and U.N. spokespersons were denied air time to 
discuss the plan.
196
 ―[M]anipulation of the state bureaucracy and media 
against the plan was documented in a 2004 report published by the Cyprus 
Action Network entitled ‗Human rights violations in Cyprus in the days 
 
 
 188. Russia Vetoes Cyprus Resolution, BBC NEWS, Apr. 22, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
europe/3648339.stm. 
 189. Smith, supra note 175. 
 190. Russia Vetoes Cyprus Resolution, supra note 188.  
 191. Id. 
 192. Demetriou, supra note 162, at 66. 
 193. Michael Young, Isle of Spite, Cyprus Remains a Fractured Place, SLATE, Apr. 26, 2004, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2099482 (quoting Chris Patten, the EU‘s external affairs commissioner). 
 194. Loizides & Keskiner, supra note 187. Many Turkish Cypriots were angry and felt 
―victimized by the Greek Cypriot vote, which prevented them from joining the EU.‖ Id. ―[R]ancour 
engulf[ed] the island in 2004‖ after the rejection by the Greek Cypriots. Bargaining Chips, Anyone?, 
ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2008, at 68. 
 195. U.S. Accuses Greek Cypriot Leaders of Derailing Unification Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 
2004, at A9. At school, teachers provided students with ―no‖ banners and T-shirts. Id. 
 196. A Chance for Peace and Unity Wasted, ECONOMIST, Apr, 27, 2004, at http://www. 
economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_NGNVGPV. 
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before the referendum.‘‖197 Dramatically, on the eve of the election, Greek 
Cypriot President Georgios Papadopoulos delivered ―a tearful appeal on 
television for Greek Cypriots to turn down the UN reunification plan.‖198 
In the waning days before the election, Britain sought a U.N. Security 
Council resolution to ―encourage a ‗yes‘ vote by strengthening the UN 
peacekeepers‘ role in verifying all sides‘ compliance with the plan,‖ in 
hopes of giving an assurance sought by one of the Greek Cypriot political 
parties, AKEL.
199
 Seemingly not a player in the dispute, Russia 
unexpectedly cast its first Security Council veto in ten years, blocking the 
resolution, and the next day, the AKEL party called for defeat of the 
plan.
200
 The Greek Cypriot government, with its Foreign Minister paying 
an unannounced visit to Moscow just before the vote, is understood to 
have appealed to Russia for the veto of the U.N. resolution.
201
 Russia and 
Cyprus share their Orthodox religion
202
 and the Greek Cypriot Orthodox 
Bishop had ―condemned the plan and urged voters to reject it at the 
referendum.‖203 
The Greek Cypriot voters overwhelmingly voted against the 
reconciliation plan (three-to-one against), while the Turkish Cypriot voters 
endorsed the plan by a substantial margin (two-to-one in favor).
204
 In May 
2004, just days after the vote, the Greek Cypriot government was admitted 
as a full EU Member State,
205
 armed with its own new accession veto and 
vested interests to protect. ―Perversely, the result means that only the 
rejectionist Greek Cypriot part of the island [would] join the European 
Union.‖206  
 
 
 197. Loizides & Keskiner, supra note 187, at 160 (footnote omitted).  
 198. Charlie Charalambous, Papadopoulos: Nationalist Who Snubbed Cyprus Unity Plan, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 12, 2008, 12/12/08 AGFRP 11:32:00 (Westlaw). 
 199. A Chance for Peace and Unity Wasted, supra note 196. The Greek communist party, named, 
in English, the Progressive Party for the Working People and abbreviated in Greek as AKEL, had 
requested the assurance. Id. See Progressive Party for the Working People, http://www.akel.org.cy/ 
nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1&tt=graphic&lang=l3 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 200. A Chance for Peace and Unity Wasted, supra note 196. 
 201. Andreas Hadjipapas & Kerin Hope, Greek Cypriots Set to Vote ―No‖ in Referendum on 
Cyprus Unification, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 23, 2004, at 8. 
 202. A Chance for Peace and Unity Wasted, supra note 196. AKEL is a Communist political 
party, and Cyprus has also retained good relations over the years with Moscow. Hadjipapas & Hope, 
supra note 201, at 8. 
 203. Kerin Hope, Annan Urges Acceptance of Cyprus Referendums Reunification Talks, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Apr. 1, 2004, at 7. 
 204. John Katsigeorgis, Cyprus Post-referendum, UN CHRONICLE ONLINE EDITION, http://www. 
un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/webArticles/073004_Cyprus.asp# (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 205. A Chance for Peace and Unity Wasted, supra note 196. 
 206. Id. Apparently, Greek Cypriot policy changed in 2003, based on the strategy that Greek 
Cypriot demands could be ―better served within the framework of Cypriot membership of the EU 
before a solution had been finalised.‖ Demetriou, supra note 162, at 87. One Greek Cypriot politician 
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This was a huge blow to the international community, since the UN, 
the EU and Turkey had put a considerable effort into winning 
support for the plan. . . . Erdogan, who took a big domestic political 
risk by pressing for a ‗yes‘ vote, described the accession of the 
divided island as a ‗big mistake‘ . . . .207 
This view is now shared by other EU countries.
208
 The EU jeopardized 
all of the progress toward Turkey‘s accession ―by its irresponsible attitude 
to Cyprus,‖ giving Cyprus a guarantee of EU entry before the reunification 
vote.
209
 ―While Ankara cajoled Turkish Cypriots to vote for the peace deal, 
the Greek Cypriots self-indulgently voted against—and now obstruct 
Turkey from within the EU.‖210 
The obstruction of the island‘s reunification also became an obstruction 
to Turkey‘s other major policy goal, EU accession for itself. The timing of 
the Cypriot vote refusal could not have been worse for Turkey‘s 
negotiation of its own accession agreement with the EU. The Cyprus 
peace referendum was held on April 24, 2004. The Greek Cypriot 
Republic of Cyprus, entered the EU alone on May 1, 2004, without the 
Turkish Cypriots. The reunification pursued by so many had been 
condemned by the aggressive, negative efforts of the Greek Cypriots. The 
Turks were even more distrustful about the Greek Cypriot deceit, which 
left north Cyprus out in the cold, as its own EU accession negotiations 
were progressing toward final agreement.  
Turkey and the EU struggled in their negotiations, but ultimately 
succeeded in agreeing to the terms that Turkey would satisfy the 
Copenhagen political criteria,
211
 as all candidates must, and furthermore 
that Turkey would sign an amendment or protocol to the 1963 EEC-
Turkey Association Agreement (the original ―Ankara Agreement‖) 
incorporating all the Member States into that relationship and also into the 
1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union.
212
 Turkey ratified that Protocol in July 
2005.
213
 But the Cypriot political drama by then had presented a difficult 
and complex situation. 
 
 
stated: ―We have actually denied Europe the ability to project the Union as a conflict-solving project.‖ 
Id. at 93. 
 207. Chislett, supra note 114, at 17. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Turkey and EU Held Hostage by Cyprus, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 1, 2006, at 16. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Turkey Accession and Cyprus, supra note 151. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
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Against this background of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot support for 
the Annan Plan,
214
 and the overpowering refusal of the Greek Cypriots to 
do the same, Turkey‘s government understandably had difficulties 
rewarding the Republic of Cyprus with formal diplomatic recognition for 
the first time so soon after it had so forcefully sabotaged the reunification 
vote.
215
 
That was difficult for [Erdogan] to do, because last April the Greek 
Cypriots rejected a plan for the reunification of the island put 
forward by [then] UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. At that time, 
Erdogan exerted great efforts to persuade the Turkish Cypriots to 
vote in favour of the Annan Plan—which they did—but the Greek 
Cypriots sabotaged the deal. To reward them now with Turkish 
recognition was, therefore, politically impossible. Turkish public 
opinion would not have accepted it.
216
 
Accordingly, in July 2005, when Turkey signed the Protocol 
incorporating the new 2004 Member States into the EU-Turkey 
Association Agreement and Customs Union, it ―issued a declaration 
saying that its signature did not mean its recognition of the Republic of 
Cyprus.‖217 This unilateral denial of Cypriot recognition was ―aimed 
squarely at countering nationalist claims [in Turkey] that Turkey ha[d] 
sold out the Turkish Cypriots as part of its bid for EU membership.‖218 
This diplomatic assertion was rebuffed by the EU in its own Declaration 
of 21 September 2005 in which the Community and Member States flatly 
demanded that Turkey formally recognize all Member States (i.e. the 
Republic of Cyprus), and remove all barriers to the free movement of 
goods among all Member States, including means of transport, and the 
failure to do so will affect the progress of Turkey‘s accession 
negotiations.
219
 
 
 
 214. The Annan Plan adjusts the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot portions of the island. 
Bargaining Chips, Anyone?, supra note 194, at 68. Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan allowed 
a divided Cyprus to enter the EU, ―leaving the Turkish Cypriots out in the cold despite pledges by the 
pan-European bloc to end the isolation of the TRNC.‖ Ulker, supra note 138. 
 215. A Date with Turkey, ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2004, http://www.economist.com/agenda/display 
story.cfm?story_id=E1_PVDNQNP. They also ―feared a nationalist backlash at home.‖ Id. 
 216. Seale, supra note 34. 
 217. Turkey Accession and Cyprus, supra note 151. 
 218. Kerin Hope & Vincent Boland, UN-Backed Peace Plan Still on Hold, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Aug. 3, 2005, at 1. 
 219. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Declaration by the European Community and 
Its Member States (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/ 
Erweiterung/TuerkeiErklaerung.pdf. 
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Attempting to agree on the specific terms for the coming October 3, 
2005 negotiations generated another crisis: Austria argued for mention of 
the ―privileged partnership‖ in the negotiations and wanted to omit 
language referring to ―accession‖ as the shared objective of the process.220 
Austria also insisted that Turkey withdraw its declaration of non-
recognition of Cyprus, and extend Customs Union treatment to Cyprus; it 
only withdrew its objections on the day of the proposed start, October 3, in 
return for an agreement to begin Croatia‘s accession negotiations.221 
Around midnight on the evening of October 3, 2005, after a ―bitter 
struggle over the terms,‖ the Negotiating Framework Protocol was signed. 
However, the terms included different requirements and more rigorous 
scrutiny than for previous accession candidates, including unequivocal 
terms requiring Turkey to support reunification efforts in Cyprus and 
fulfill its obligations under the Additional Protocol, specifically pertaining 
to the customs union, with close monitoring by the EU.
222
 One politician 
in Turkey at this time reacted prophetically: ―The EU is constantly 
imposing double standards on Turkey. Even if they say yes on October 3, 
the talks will never end.‖223 
The Commission‘s next report observed that Turkey had made no 
progress in extending recognition towards Cyprus, and as explained above, 
the Member States wrestled with how to pressure Turkey into compliance. 
In December 2006, the EU Council suspended negotiations on eight 
chapters of the acquis relevant to the Republic of Cyprus, and agreed to 
refrain from closing any further chapters until Turkey complied with the 
Association Agreement requirements vis-à-vis Cyprus.
224
 
Thus, the Republic of Cyprus has effectively executed its strategy to 
dominate the relationship with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. Since the 
beginning of Turkey‘s accession negotiations, the Republic of Cyprus 
continually obstructed the process. ―The Greek-Cypriots have been 
 
 
 220. Grigoriadis, supra note 7, at 154–55. 
 221. Id. Perhaps Austria‘s government was stiffening its position on Turkey might allow a 
subsequent compromise to unblock accession negotiations for Croatia. Id. 
 222. Craig S. Smith, European Union Formally Opens Talks on Turkey’s Joining, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 4, 2005, at A1. See Atila Eralp, Turkey and the European Union in 2005, MEDITERRANEAN 
YEARBOOK, 2006, at 141 (2006) (suggesting that terms were different and more rigorous than for other 
candidates). The terms of the agreement are set forth plainly in the document itself. See Negotiating 
Framework, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 
2009). 
 223. Graham Bowley, A Standoff Threatens EU-Turkey Negotiation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-eu.html (quoting Umit Ozdag, 
leader of Turkey‘s MHP party). 
 224. Press Release, 2770th Council Meeting, supra note 115, at 2, 9. 
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subverting Turkey‘s EU membership ever since‖ the divided country was 
allowed to join the EU without a settlement of the island‘s division.225 
Even opening negotiations on the first, innocuous chapter of the acquis 
relating to Science and Technology was vetoed (even though it contains no 
real law and was intended to be closed the same day it was opened), and 
Cyprus threatened to block further negotiations if its demands were not 
met.
226
 Subsequently, Cyprus labored in late 2006 to impose the strongest 
possible measures against Turkey, further blocking negotiations.
227
 More 
recently, in June 2009, Cyprus promised to continue its block of 
negotiations on the energy chapter due to Turkey‘s interference with its 
gas exploration off coastal waters.
228
 Cypriot leaders have issued much 
rhetoric of fairness to Turkey, but their actions have consistently halted 
Turkey‘s progress in the negotiations. Cypriot Foreign Minister, Markos 
Kyprianou, announced in May 2009 that his government had no 
immediate plans to veto Turkey‘s ultimate accession, but that it would 
―reflect‖ on whether to permit the opening of new chapters for 
negotiation.
229
 
Not only has the Greek Cypriot government vetoed Turkey‘s 
negotiating progress in addition to sabotaging the Annan Plan for 
reunifying Cyprus, but it has also subsequently punished the northern part 
of the island by blocking EU efforts to reduce the isolation of the TRNC 
community. The Greek Cypriots blocked EU funds to and disallowed 
direct trade with the poorer northern community, thus continuing the 
community‘s isolation and increasing the Greek Cypriot leverage over 
them.
230
 In April 2004, just before the vote on the Annan Plan, the EU 
 
 
 225. A Hawkish Problem, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2009, at 57. 
 226. Beunderman, supra note 39. 
 227. Supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.  
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visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
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 230.  
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Council announced that it was ―determined to put an end to the isolation of 
the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of 
Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 
community.‖231 From 2004 onward, Greek Cypriot President 
Papadopoulos blocked EU attempts to reward the northern Cypriots for 
their support of the reunification plan with financial aid and direct trade 
links.
232
 In February 2006, the EU approved Council Regulation 389/2006 
in an effort to end the northern sector‘s isolation, promote the island‘s 
reunification through economic integration, and improve contact between 
the two communities and with the EU by establishing an instrument of 
financial support for encouraging the economic development of the 
Turkish Cypriot community.
233
 The Regulation specifies development of, 
inter alia, infrastructure for energy, transport, the environment, 
telecommunications, and water supply; confident building measures; 
support to civil society; promotion of people-to-people contacts; and 
assistance in preparation for the implementation of the acquis.
234
 The EU 
specifically explained that the purpose of the €259 million in aid to the 
Turkish Cypriot community was to ―ease the breakaway state‘s isolation, 
after a divided Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 when Greek Cypriots 
rejected [the] UN reunification plan.‖235 By mid-July 2008, only 20% of 
the €259 million allotted funds had been authorized by the Council for 
expenditure.
236 
According to Professor Neophytos Loizides, ―many Turkish Cypriots 
[felt] victimized by the Greek Cypriot vote, which prevented them from 
joining the EU. They also regard the international community as having 
been too slow to support them financially and politically.‖237 Further, 
 
 
Hope & Boland, supra note 218. ―The EU then rubbed salt in the wounds by reneging on its promise 
to open direct trade with Turkish Cypriots.‖ Chislett, supra note 114, at 17. 
 231. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Second 
Annual Report 2007 on the Implementation of Community Assistance at 1, COM (2008) 551 final 
(quoting Council Regulation 389/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 65) 5 (EC)). 
 232. Quentin Peel, How Cyprus’s Wounds Are Hurting Europe, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 23, 
2004, at 21. 
 233. Council Regulation 389/2006, pmbl. ¶ 2, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 65) 5 (establishing an 
instrument of financial support for encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot 
community).  
 234. Id. 
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 236. European Commission Enlargement, Turkish Cypriot Community, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
enlargement/turkish_cypriot_community/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (citing Council 
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 The first four years of Cypriot membership amount to a failure 
for the EU‘s enlargement policy. . . . Turkish-Cypriots were 
promised access to all the familiar instruments of European soft 
power. Direct trade with the EU was to be encouraged, and €259m 
was to be spent on things like scholarships, waterworks and projects 
to foster links between the two Cypriot communities. But progress 
has foundered on Turkish-Cypriot demands for direct trade and 
Greek-Cypriot blocking of any project that implies recognition of 
authorities in the Turkish north.
238
 
―The Greek Cypriots have shown few qualms in Brussels about extending 
their disputes with the Turkish Cypriots to broader issues of EU policy,‖ 
such as, threatening to veto an EU action plan for the Caucausus, unless 
Azerbaijan gave up its plans to permit flights from Azerbaijan into the 
TRNC.
239
 
In Brussels, Cypriot diplomats‘ obstruction of EU projects designed to 
end the isolation of the north caused anger among EU leaders, many of 
whom say Cyprus should never have been admitted as a divided island. In 
truth, the EU had no choice, again, because of the accession veto—in the 
run-up to the huge 2004 enlargement, Greece made it clear that it would 
not approve any new expansion of the EU unless it included Cyprus.
240
 
The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, recently argued that 
because none of the promises to the Turkish Cypriots made by the EU and 
the U.N. have been kept, efforts to pressure Turkey to open ports and 
airports to Cyprus are not in good faith.
241
 Commentators agree:  
 While demanding Ankara admit Cyprus ships and goods, 
Brussels has not delivered on its pledge to end the isolation of 
Turkish Cyprus. The Cyprus issue can be resolved if Member States 
are prepared to put the strategic interests of the Union above the 
narrow interests of the Nicosia government. On present form, 
however, the EU is now widely seen to have retreated behind a wall 
of dissembling waffle and to be acting in bad faith.
242
 
 
 
 238. No Love Lost, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2008, Special Report at 8, 8. ―Turkish Cypriots and the 
government in Ankara continue to feel let down by the Greek Cypriot rejection in the 2004 referendum 
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―What is clear is that the EU complicated matters hugely by letting a 
divided Cyprus join. ‗Had [the EU] been less rigid and cleverer, it would 
have lifted the sanctions long ago and thereby minimised the dependence 
of northern Cyprus on Ankara.‘‖243 Many diplomats and politicians in 
Brussels argue that Cyprus was allowed in the EU too soon; once a 
candidate country becomes member, the EU loses much of its leverage.
244
 
For example, after Cyprus‘s accession, Papodopoulos lengthened the list 
of objections to the Annan Plan and ―resisted UN pleas to ease the process 
of restarting talks by setting out the Greek Cypriots‘ priorities for changes 
in the peace plan.‖245 In 2007, the Greek Cypriots were seen as ―stalling 
any deal to reunite their island, search[ing] for any means to take their 
specific dispute with Turkey into the wider EU negotiations.‖246  
Because Cyprus‘s membership in the EU now makes the likelihood of 
a settlement on the island unlikely, thus the accession of a divided Cyprus 
before unifying the island stands openly as a ―serious foreign policy 
failure in itself and for Europe‘s future relations with Turkey.‖247 Since the 
beginning, ―EU member countries had long been aware that Cyprus was a 
potential dealbreaker—the EU enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, 
likened the Cyprus issue to a ‗train wreck‘ waiting to happen.‖248 In 
response, one commentator added: ―Irrespective of whether it is any 
longer realistic to believe Turkey will one day join the EU, that would be a 
geopolitically catastrophic train wreck.‖249 
C. International Inequity? 
The Republic of Cyprus and the ―international community‖ have 
consistently maintained that the division of Cyprus is illegal and that the 
Greek Cypriot government is the only legitimate government of the 
island.
250
 The U.N.‘s Annan Plan advocated a bi-zonal agreement granting 
the Turkish Cypriots a protective measure of autonomy and power-
sharing, but the Greek Cypriots have rejected that. U.N. resolutions 
twenty-five years ago provided that the legal basis for the TRNC‘s and 
Turkey‘s condemnation rested on contemporary international power 
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structures, accomplishing little but to punish the poorer Turkish 
Cypriots.
251
 These resolutions have been ineffective: the Greek Cypriots 
have not achieved their goal of establishing a Hellenistic unitary state on 
the island. Such a result will not occur under the U.N.-sponsored peace 
plan that offers bi-zonal authority. The Greek Cypriots seem less 
interested in that power-sharing reunification than with using their EU 
membership card to force the Turks and Turkish Cypriots into a 
subordinate position. Past performances suggest that the Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot leaders will not yield the highly valued, protective 
principle of a bi-zonal and bi-communal state. So breakthrough appears 
unlikely. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has stated the obvious: 
―Everything is reciprocal. No one can expect anything from us. If we don‘t 
see a positive signal coming, no one should expect a positive gesture from 
us. . . .‘‖252 
The inequity is that Turkey and the isolated Turkish Cypriots are held 
solely at fault and therefore hostage to the anachronistic U.N. resolutions 
dating back to 1974
253
 and an ill-advised EU decision in 2004 to allow 
Cyprus to accede to full membership before cooperating with the U.N. 
One side alone should not be called to judgment for this tragedy; history 
discloses sufficient culpability on both sides. In recent years, the 
international community has not shown a common or consistent position 
regarding the recognition of separating states, as has been and is currently 
illustrated by disparate treatment in the countries of the former 
Yugoslavia, the break-away of countries of the former Soviet Union, and 
others.
254
 With and without the consent of their former superior 
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governments, scores of new governments have proclaimed independence, 
and many have achieved U.N. or other international recognition.
255
 
―International lawyers need not be reminded of the revolutionary and 
unclear character of self-determination . . . The discourse of national self-
determination contains little that is self-evident on which everyone can 
agree. Disagreements reflect political priorities and partisan positions.‖256 
International law offers no clear and simple formula for resolving conflicts 
over separatist claims, as opposing principles promote contrary interests 
and results.
257
 International law can generate anomalies,
258
 and the Turkish 
government has not been tolerant of this one. So, the international 
community faces a standoff. Greece blocked Turkey and reconciliation for 
years, and now Cyprus does the same. All sides are at fault. It is time for a 
solution. 
The only way to resolve this problem if for all sides to moderate their 
approaches, which previously have  
been primarily informed by [each] side‘s very different experience 
of the island‘s recent traumatic past, and has therefore been one-
sided and categorical. To achieve a compromise, what seems to be 
most needed is a fresh, more flexible and forward-looking 
reconsideration by both sides on how to understand these two basic 
principles [bi-zonality and fundamental rights].
259
 
And they need to begin the reconciliation soon before the situation 
worsens. The International Crisis Group warns that, should the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots fail to reach an agreement on reunification before the 
April 2010 elections in the TRNC, pro-compromise president Talat will 
 
 
2007, at 37.  
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 256. Marti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice, 43 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 241, 244 (1994). 
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the legitimacy of states, often reflecting political expedience, subjectivity, see Hugg, supra note 153, at 
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likely be replaced by a candidate much less willing to cooperate, leaving 
partition of the island as the only option on the table.
260
  
IV. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION AND THE TRNC 
ELECTIONS 
Two additional events in 2009 have interposed further obstacles to 
Turkey‘s advance toward the European Union, both arising from the broad 
stand-off regarding the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC, and negotiations 
for the island‘s re-unification.261 A judicial decision by the European Court 
of Justice in Luxembourg (―ECJ‖) and the 2009 parliamentary election in 
the TRNC complicate matters further and lessen the prospects for 
Turkey‘s accession. 
A. The Apostolides Decision 
One of the principal issues in Cypriot reunification negotiations is, of 
course, how to resolve property rights following the island‘s military 
division in 1974 and the widespread ―agreed transfer of populations.‖262 In 
April 2009, the European Court of Justice issued a far-reaching decision, 
Apostolides v. Orams,
263
 directly addressing the property rights of Cypriots 
in both the north and south who lost their homes after the 1974 division of 
the island, as well as subsequent holders of property that had previously 
been occupied and owned by the displaced residents.
264
 
―The property issue is perhaps the most complex and contentious 
aspect of the Cyprus problem, owing to numerous and diverse legal, 
economic, and social complexities. Most important, however, is the 
political significance the two sides attach to it.‖265 The property issue 
affects so many people in so many ways: first, it directly implicates the 
 
 
 260. Delphine Strauss, ICG warns of Possible Cyprus Partition, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, http:// 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f46ba790-ad2a-11de-9caf-00144feabdc0.html. ―A permanent split . . . would 
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sides[.]‖ Id.  
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FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 28, 2009, 4/28/09 AGFRP 11:43:00 (Westlaw). 
 263.  Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, (EC) 2009 WL 1117885 (Apr. 28, 2009), available at 
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―individual rights and interests of a large part of the populations on both 
sides of the island (that is, almost half of the population in the north and 
about one-third in the south)‖;266 second, it will impact the economic, 
social, and geopolitical makeup of the island if the island is reunified, as is 
hoped by most.
267
 TRNC authorities estimate that, pre-1974, 63.8% of 
property in its jurisdiction was owned by Greek Cypriots, while Greek 
Cypriot authorities set the figure at 78.5%.
268
 Conversely in the south, 
Turkish Cypriot numbers assert that its people owned 22% of property in 
the south, while Greek Cypriot estimates are at 13.9%.
269
 Displaced 
persons following the 1974 split include some 142,000 Greek Cypriots 
from north to south, and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots from south to north, 
totaling a migration of nearly 30% of the island‘s population.270  
Further aggravating the problem, 
the passage of several decades without a political solution has 
complicated the property issue further, turning it into an immense 
technical and legal conundrum. With time, the number of 
individuals involved continues to multiply, as properties are 
transferred or change hands through inheritance or sale, or are 
transformed through development.
271
 
The Apostolides decision could also ―have far-ranging ramifications for 
the fast-growing Cyprus second home market . . . . [with] 22,000 foreign 
investors involved in property in northern Cyprus,‖272 leading to 
―thousands of claims against foreign buyers by Greek Cypriots eager for 
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the return of land taken during the Turkish invasion of the north.‖273 The 
Telegraph, a U.K. newspaper, ―estimates that there are approximately 
4,000 British citizen property owners in northern Cyprus‖ that may be 
subject to litigation.
274
 
Hence, settling the property issue affects many people on and off the 
island, implicating not only actual property and economic issues, but also 
deeply-held social and political beliefs. As is illustrated plainly by the 
facts and holdings of the case, the ECJ‘s decision stands as a strong 
affirmation of the Republic of Cyprus‘s claim to legitimacy over the entire 
island and as a threatening invitation for the many Greek Cypriots with 
property claims in Cyprus to resolve them through private litigation, rather 
than through the present ongoing U.N. negotiations. 
B. The Apostolides Facts—A Perfect Storm? 
The Apostolides case reached the top court in Europe, the ECJ, by 
referral from the national court directly adjudicating the matter, pursuant 
to EC Treaty Article 234.
275
 The U.K. court requesting the Article 234 
reference was the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 
which had jurisdiction to hear the Apostolides enforcement action on 
appeal from the original U.K. judge in the High Court. Mr. Justice Jack of 
the U.K. High Court set forth the facts in more detail than the ECJ, and 
therefore his recitation offers the source herein, unless otherwise noted.
276
 
Apostolides v. Orams presents the classic conflict following sectarian 
violence causing ―population exchanges.‖277 Claimant, Meletis 
Apostolides, and his family were forced to leave their house in the 
 
 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
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O.J. (C 321) E1. See generally WYATT & DASHWOOD‘S EUROPEAN UNION LAW 501 (5th ed. 2006). 
 276. Orams v. Apostolides, [2006] EWHC (Q.B.) 2226. The ECJ‘s recitation of the facts is 
typically terse, and the referring U.K. court explains the facts in more helpful detail. The facts in this 
paragraph are taken from these pages of the case itself. 
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euphemistically entitled ―Population Exchange Agreement,‖ permitting the safe transfer of remaining 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots out of hostile territory and into their respective parts of the 
island. The Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 370 (1975), Annex ¶¶ 1–5, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/11789 (Aug. 5, 
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northern Cypriot district of Kyrenia in 1974, as a result of the military 
division of the island, described above, that sent tens of thousands of 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots fleeing for safety. For the forty-five years 
thereafter, the Apostolides family has resided in the Greek Cypriot 
southern part of Cyprus. Control of the land ―abandoned‖ by those fleeing 
in both parts of the island was assumed by the respective governments and 
either sold or otherwise assigned for new use. In 2002, Respondents David 
and Linda Orams, who are British citizens residing in Sussex, United 
Kingdom, purchased a part of the land in question for £50,000 and spent 
some further £160,000 building a villa and other improvements on the 
land. They bought the land from its legally registered Turkish Cypriot 
owner in accord with Turkish Cypriot real property law. The Orams were 
told that this Turkish Cypriot owner had given up property in southern 
Cyprus in the 1974 violence.  
When a crossover checkpoint was opened and transit first became 
possible between north and south Cyprus in 2003, Apostolides traveled 
over to visit the property. The next year, relying on the family‘s original 
title to the land, he sued the Orams in the District Court of Nicosia, the 
capital of the Republic of Cyprus, seeking orders from the Greek Cypriot 
court to command that the Orams demolish their villa, hand over 
possession of the property to him, and pay monetary damages. The same 
day, formal service of the suit was performed on Mrs. Orams, requiring 
her and her husband to plead a response within ten days. The service 
documents were printed in Greek, which the Orams could not read. 
Thirteen days later, Apostolides applied for default judgments on all 
claims, as no appearance had been filed for the Orams. The following day, 
the district court granted the default judgments, awarding Apostolides 
possession of the land and all other relief sought, including substantial 
damages, monthly rent until the property is handed over, and interest at 
eight percent. Subsequently, that same day, a lawyer for the Orams sought 
to enter their formal appearance in the proceeding, but the default 
judgments had already been entered. 
The next week, the Orams filed a motion in the same district court to 
set aside the default judgments. Four days later, the court denied the 
motion in a thirty-six page judgment, justifying the court‘s jurisdiction and 
citing a decision of the European Court of Human Rights that held that 
ownership remained in the original Greek Cypriot owner‘s hands, and 
rejecting arguments based on the good faith purchase by the Orams, local 
custom, and the irrelevancy of EU Regulation No. 44/2001 regarding 
recognition of judgments in the courts of other Member States.  
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Subsequently, in 2005, Apostolides applied in a U.K. court to have the 
Greek Cypriot judgments registered and declared enforceable in the 
United Kingdom, pursuant to EC Regulation 44/2001 on the enforcement 
of judgments of other Member States.
278
 The registration and enforcement 
proceeding, pursuant to that EC Regulation, allows no submissions by the 
party against whom enforcement is sought, and the presiding Master 
ordered the judgments registered and declared enforceable. Mr. Orams 
appealed that ruling, as the EC regulation allows, and the appellate High 
Court overturned the lower court‘s order. Apostolides appealed that 
reversal to the U.K. Court of Appeal, which then stayed the proceeding 
and referred legal issues to the ECJ.  
C. The Legal Appeals in the UK and the European Court of Justice 
In his High Court judgment of September 6, 2006, which refused to 
order enforcement of the Greek Cypriot judgments, the presiding Mr. 
Justice Jack addressed five issues he discerned in the appeal. First, he 
considered the issues arising from the situation of the land. Mr. Justice 
Jack observed that European Community law, the acquis, had been 
suspended in the areas ―in which the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus does not exercise effective control,‖279 e.g., the territory of the 
TRNC, by Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Accession by which the Republic 
of Cyprus became a Member State. He evaluated arguments for and 
against application of the acquis in the TRNC, concluding: 
I fully recognise the difficulty of the problem. I have concluded, 
however, that the correct analysis is that the effect of [Protocol 10] 
is that the acquis, and therefore Regulation 44/2001, are of no effect 
in relation to matters which relate to the area controlled by the 
TRNC, and that this prevents Mr Apostolides relying on it to seek to 
enforce the judgments which he has obtained . . . . [T]he conflict . . . 
such as the present between the de facto situation in northern 
Cyprus and its system of law, and the enforcement of judgments 
such as the present against the new ‗owners‘ of Greek Cypriot 
property, who have assets elsewhere in the European Union . . . . is 
 
 
 278. Apostolides v. Orams, (EC) 2009 WL 1117885, ¶ 29 (Apr. 28, 2009). 
 279. Orams v. Apostolides, [2006] EWHC (Q.B.) 2226, [15] (citing Treaty Concerning the 
Accession of the Czech Republic, The Republic of Estonia, The Republic of Cyprus, The Republic of 
Latvia, The Republic of Lithuania, The Republic of Hungary, The Republic of Malta, The Republic of 
Poland, The Republic of Slovenia, and The Slovak Republic to the European Union, Sept. 23, 2003, 
2003 O.J. (L 236), Protocol No 10, art. 1). 
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an international problem ill-suited to be resolved by private 
litigation. The cases which I have cited in the European Court of 
Human Rights show that compensation can be obtained at a higher 
level of litigation, with the State of Turkey as the defendant. They 
show also the development through the influence of that court of a 
scheme to provide compensation. These practical considerations 
support the conclusion that Protocol 10 is to be given the effect I 
have found that it should have.
280
 
Further, Mr. Justice Jack reasoned that the Orams were given 
insufficient time to respond to the initial summons. Relying on EC 
Regulation 44/2001, Article 34.2, which provides that a default judgment 
shall not be recognized if the service documents initiating the proceeding 
were not served ―in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable [a 
respondent] to arrange for his defense,‖281 he concluded that the judgments 
in question should not be recognized. Dismissing additional objections and 
arguments from both sides, Mr. Justice Jack ruled the appeal to be 
allowed.  
Apostolides appealed to the U.K. Court of Appeal, and in June 2007, 
that appellate court stayed the proceeding and referred legal issues arising 
from the case to the European Court of Justice.
282
 The European Court of 
Justice received the referral in September 2007 and rendered its grand 
chamber judgment on April 28, 2009.
283
  
The ECJ held that Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty must be read 
restrictively, as a derogation from that Treaty and ―limited to what is 
absolutely necessary‖ to achieve the objectives of the Treaty.284 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Protocol 10 could not be interpreted 
to preclude application of Regulation No. 44/2001, which requires the 
recognition of judgments of other Member State courts.
285
 The Court 
reasoned that Protocol 10‘s derogation does not preclude application of the 
EC Regulation to judgments of a Cypriot court. Protocol 10‘s suspension 
applies only to the application of the acquis in the northern area of Cyprus, 
but the judgments involved in this case were given by a court in the 
 
 
 280. Orams, [2006] EWHC (Q.B.) 2226, [30]. 
 281. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 34, ¶ 2, 2001 O.J. (L 12) (EC). 
 282. Case C-420/07, Apostolides, ¶ 31. See also James Lumley, Britons Cyprus Holiday Home 
Dispute Sent to EU‘s Highest Court, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601102&sid=aKOIg8EzEqAo&refer=uk. 
 283. Case C-420/07, Apostolides; see id. ¶ 82 (ruling of the Court). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
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government-controlled Republic of Cyprus. The land‘s location in the 
northern area changes nothing because first, location does not nullify the 
obligation by the court to apply the EC Regulation in the southern part, 
and second, the Regulation does not necessarily have to be applied in that 
northern part.
286
 
Next, the ECJ concluded that the case did concern ―civil and 
commercial matters‖ so as to qualify under the applicable terms of 
Regulation No 44/2001.
287
 The Court further ruled that the Cypriot district 
court below had proper jurisdiction pursuant to the Regulation over the 
land in the northern area because that land ―is situated in the territory of 
the Republic of Cyprus.‖288 In response to the referral issue of whether the 
practical unenforceability of the judgments in the northern area constituted 
grounds for a refusal to apply the Regulation under its Article 34(1) 
exception for matters contrary to the public policy of the Member State in 
which enforcement is sought, the Court rejected that argument, insisting 
that matters of public policy sufficient to warrant such an exception to the 
Regulation must amount to a ―manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as 
essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or 
of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order.‖289 
Because the court below raised no such fundamental principle in the U.K. 
legal order, the exception did not apply. The Court added that anticipated 
difficulties in enforcing the judgment do not deprive the judgments of their 
enforceability pursuant to Article 38(1) of the Regulation—they have been 
legally declared as enforceable by the proper court, as that subsection of 
the Regulation requires.
290
 
Finally, the ECJ addressed the Regulation‘s provision for refusing 
recognition of judgments when defendants have not been given sufficient 
time in which to arrange their defense and challenge the proceeding in the 
original court. The Court explained that the record below in this case 
showed that the Orams did raise that challenge in the Greek Cypriot court 
on November 9, 2004, at their lawyer‘s first appearance, and thus 
inadequate time was not an issue.
291
  
 
 
 286. Id. 
 287. Council Directive 2001/44/EC, art. 34(2), 2001 O.J. (L 175) 17–20. 
 288. Case C-420/07, Apostolides, ¶ 51. 
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D. The Significance of the ECJ’s Ruling 
The Apostolides judgment represents a complex interpretation of 
numerous legal rules and jurisdictional concepts arising from litigation 
unfortunately imbedded in a conundrum involving private law, public 
international law, and public policy dimensions. Its legal logic and 
wisdom aside, it leaves little uncertainty about its effects on the current 
U.N. settlement process in Cyprus, and hence on Turkey‘s accession 
progress. The ECJ‘s ruling fundamentally alters the balance of power in 
the ongoing U.N. negotiations regarding the reconciliation of the island 
because it grants Greek Cypriots an alternative method, outside of a 
negotiated agreement with the TRNC, to reclaim their property in the 
North. Hence, little incentive to negotiate or cooperate remains. Nowhere 
in the antiseptic text of the judgment does the ECJ mention these 
negotiations, nor the human implications of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot people. 
The decision has been widely condemned by Turkish Cypriots, for it 
flatly denies the legitimate existence of the TRNC, casts further doubt on 
its property values, disempowers the reunification process, and thus, 
undermines the accession of their sole ally and guarantor, Turkey. The 
ECJ‘s grand chamber ruling substantially weakens the TRNC‘s 
negotiating leverage in the U.N. talks, as it has naturally siphoned off 
much of the Republic of Cyprus‘s incentive to negotiate or compromise 
toward reconciliation in earnest. If Greek Cypriots can pursue northern 
Cypriot property claims in their own home courts, why would their 
government compromise in international negotiations on these rights?
292
 
The thousands of judgments that are certain to follow the Apostolides 
precedent will surely destabilize the entire real property regime of the 
TRNC. The government of the Republic of Cyprus naturally welcomed the 
Court‘s decision.293 Armed with this judgment, the Republic of Cyprus 
will not likely contribute to the further progress on this important issue. 
This result will never be adopted by the TRNC or Turkey, thus, the 
Apostolides ruling or strategy ultimately leads back to stalemate.  
British MEP, Sarah Ludford, found the Apostolides decision 
problematic: ―The technical legal correctness of this ruling may be 
 
 
 292. ―The long-awaited and complex ruling is likely to strengthen any legal claims Greek Cypriots 
might want to assert over their former properties, and a lawyer warned foreigners with suspect land 
there to seek advice.‖ Bottollier-Depois, supra note 263. 
 293. Cyprus Welcomes EU Court Ruling on Property in North, FIN. MIRROR, Apr. 28, 2009, 
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unquestionable, based on EU measures providing for ‗mutual recognition‘ 
of judgements between two EU countries, in this case the Republic of 
Cyprus and the UK.‖294 However, Ludford points out the blaring irony (or 
legalistic myopia): ―[I]t will strike many as strange that while EU law is 
suspended in north Cyprus due to the division of the island—so the 
judgement cannot be enforced there—the same EU law can be used for a 
backdoor enforcement of the claim in UK courts.‖295  
Moreover, the Apostolides decision deepens the frustrations of Turkish-
Cypriots for another reason: they voted for reunification under the 
comprehensive U.N. peace plan, which included settlement of the property 
issues, only to have it rejected by the Greek-Cypriots.
296
 And, as noted in 
the previous section, the EU‘s heralded promises to end the TRNC‘s 
isolation have yielded little in reality.
297
 
The lead negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots in the current U.N. talks 
called the decision a ―great blow‖ to negotiations for reuniting the island 
itself.
298
 The President of the TRNC agreed: 
A despondent Mr. Talat says the EU is to blame for Turkish 
Cypriots‘ waning enthusiasm for re-unification. He cites the EU‘s 
failure to open markets to northern Cyprus trade and accuses it of 
favouring Greek Cypriots. After the ECJ decision [in Apostolides], 
he said ‗this is crystal clear, there is no vagueness.‘299 
Talat directly linked the property issues to the overall settlement 
process, issuing a statement after the Apostolides judgment was 
announced: ―Unless the Cyprus problem is solved, it is not possible to 
solve the property issue comprehensively.‖300 The TRNC authorities will 
continue issuing property titles for purchasers of dispossessed land, 
 
 
 294. Baroness Sarah Luford, European Court Judgment on Property in North Cyprus, May 1, 
2009, http://www.sarahludford.libdems.org.uk/news/001214/european_court_judgement_on_property 
_in_north_cyprus.html. 
 295. Id. 
 296. The Annan Plan would have adjusted the border between the two parts of the island 
northward, allowing some 120,000 displaced Greek-Cypriot to return to the former lands, but the 
trickier issue is what to do about some ―100,000 Greeks who might claim property in the Turkish part. 
. . .‖ Bargaining Chips, Anyone?, supra note 194, at 68. 
 297. Luford, supra note 294. 
 298. Strauss, supra note 261. 
 299. Id. 
 300. EU Court Backs Return of Northern Cyprus Property, EU BUSINESS NEWS, Apr. 29, 2009, 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1240908422.64/. More recently, Talat felt ―weak and angry‖ in 
the ongoing peace talks as a result of the the ECJ‘s judgment (and other events). Turkish Cypriot Feels 
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according to Talat, and if the U.K. court enforces the Greek Cypriot 
claims, ―our people will push us to get out of negotiations.‖301 
Ultimately, MEP Ludford concluded, 
The [Apostolides] decision makes it all the more vital that the EU 
finally weighs in to help push forward quickly a political settlement 
on the island. It has always been recognised that property restitution 
or compensation, for the rights of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
forced to leave their properties at the time of partition, will be one 
of the trickiest issues. It is an indictment of politicians, Cypriot but 
also European, that this matter has been left to lawyers to sort out 
because negotiators have failed for so long.
302
 
Kutred Ozersay, a law expert at the East Mediterranean University in 
Famagusta in northern Cyprus, points out that the decision also could 
hinder the reunification negotiations because it ―will create tension 
between the two communities.‖303 Moreover, ―[p]roperty rights are one of 
the sensitive aspects of the latest round of reunification negotiations 
between Greek Cypriot President Demetris Christofias and the northern 
leader, Mehmet Ali Talat.‖304 
The popular Turkish daily newspaper, Hurryiet, cited experts 
predicting that the Apostolides decision threatens both Turkey and the 
TRNC with economic ruin.
305
 The director of the Center for Global 
Political trends in Istanbul estimates the total cost of the disputed claims is 
around $40 billion USD, and he agrees with other experts that the only 
reasonable solution was to resolve the disputes through a comprehensive 
plan negotiated between the two governments on Cyprus.
306
 The Cyprus 
expert for the Eurasian Strategic Research Center concluded that the ECJ‘s 
decision removed ―Turkish Cypriot sovereignty over the northern part of 
the island.‖307 
Soon after the judgment was announced, Turkish Cypriot daily 
newspaper, Kibris, reported that the Cypriot Platform of Economic 
Organizations, comprising seven Turkish Cypriot organizations, had held 
a press conference and presented its declaration on the ECJ Apostolides 
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decision.
308
 The document, which will also be presented to the U.N., 
emphasized that the decision was improper and that it would negatively 
affect efforts for a Cyprus settlement.
309
 
Finally of course, without settlement of this issue, ―there is little 
prospect of Greek Cypriots lifting blocks on key areas of Turkey‘s EU 
membership negotiations.‖310 The Turkish government naturally rejected 
the ECJ decision as ―unacceptable‖ and ―hurting‖ Cyprus‘s ongoing peace 
talks, insisting that ―[t]he ‗Cyprus Republic‘ does not exist anymore as a 
partnership state which was founded in 1960, and the Greek Cypriots do 
not have any jurisdiction over Turkish Cypriots nor authority to represent 
the entire island.‘‖311 The U.N. negotiation talks broke down the month 
after the Apostolides decision when the Turkish Cypriots wanted fuel to be 
allowed through one of the cross-over U.N. checkpoints and the Turkish 
Cypriot leaders expressed skepticism that the talks would succeed.
312
 
E. The 2009 TRNC Parliamentary Elections 
Finally, and further dimming hopes for Cyprus‘s reunification, nine 
days before the ECJ‘s announcement of its Apostolides judgment, voters in 
the April 2009 TRNC parliamentary elections demonstrated their 
disappointment in the island‘s reconciliation process and their ―growing 
distrust of [the] policy of reconciliation with the majority Greek 
Cypriots.‖313 The election produced a new Prime Minister with an absolute 
majority in the parliament, generating a change in regime, and ―returning 
to power an old-style nationalist party, many of whose voters oppose 
reunification.‖314 Pointedly, the seventy-two year old new Prime Minister 
and hawkish leader of the Turkish Cypriot National Unity Party (―UBP‖), 
 
 
 308. Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, http://www.news/cyprus/tcpr/2009/09-06-
19.tcpr.html#05 (last visited June 9, 2009). 
 309. Id. 
 310. Strauss, supra note 262. 
 311. Turkey Says ECJ Ruling on Cyprus Property Case Hurts Peace Talks, HURRIYET, 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11659312.asp (last visited June 3, 2009). 
 312. Turkish Cypriots Pessimistic, KATHIMERINI, May 23, 2009, http://www.ekathimerini.com/ 
4dcgi/_w_articles_world_2_23/05/2009_107427. 
 313. Odul Asik Ulker, Hardliners Win Turkish Cypriot Vote, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 19, 
2009, 4/19/09 AGFRP 21:19:00 (Westlaw). See also A Hawkish Problem, supra note 225, at 57. 
Election results reflect ―voters‘ disillusion over the UN-sponsored talks that have dragged on.‖ Id. 
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Dervis Eroglu, openly questions the course of the settlement negotiations 
and any federal arrangement for reunification.
315
  
In the elections, Eroglu‘s UBP party won twenty-six of the fifty seats 
in the TRNC legislature, empowering it to form a cabinet without need for 
a coalition.
316
 Current President Talat, of the more moderate Republican 
Turkish Party (―CTP‖), remains in office until April 2010, when the 
presidency is up for regular election again.
317
 Thus, Talat will continue to 
lead the TRNC‘s U.N. negotiating team, but his bargaining position is 
weakened by the divergence of governmental power between the opposing 
political parties that control the head of state and head of government: his 
room for maneuver will be limited by a parliament dominated by the 
nationalists,
318
 and his authority to make any concessions necessary in the 
negotiations may be questioned.
319
 
Eroglu‘s UBP Party claimed 44% of the vote, giving it enough seats for 
an absolute majority in the parliament and representing a strong rebuke of 
the more moderate CTP allied with President Talat.
320
 The right wing EBP 
won 26 of the 50 Parliament seats, with the local press attributing the 
defeat to voters‘ wishes to punish the CTP for the lack of progress in the 
reunification talks, the continuing isolation of the TRNC, and the 
worsening economy.
321
 Talat explained after the election that the 
nationalists had exploited the people‘s disappointment with the failure of 
the EU and the international community to fulfill their promises.
322
 The 
UBP as a party does not support the federal model central to the ongoing 
negotiations, but rather favors two separate states, calling for a rethink of 
the reunification process.
323
 The people of the TRNC are losing their belief 
―day by day that the negotiation process will yield a result.‖324 
Two days after the election, Eroglu announced that he would pursue a 
settlement of the island‘s divisions, but he wanted to reconsider the 
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approach to the negotiations
325
 and stressed that any settlement should be 
based on two states—a concept strongly opposed by the Greek Cypriots 
that differs from the bi-zonal federation being discussed at the U.N. 
talks.
326
 Eroglu was direct: ―There are two peoples, two states and two 
democracies on the island of Cyprus. We support any settlement . . . 
within that framework.‖327 
Some complain that ―[t]he UBP government is making the already 
complex settlement negotiations . . . even more difficult . . . [as Eroglu] is 
pushing for his party to have a seat at the negotiating table.‖328 He pledged 
during his campaign to scrap the TRNC properties commission, which was 
designed to establish a process for returning property to Greek Cypriot 
owners, a move that could only undermine the settlement talks.
329
 
News sources reported that, following the election, Turkish Cypriot 
nationalists celebrated, but ―despair has gripped the Republic of Cyprus,‖ 
and Cypriot leaders characterized it as a ―negative development for the 
efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus issue.‖330 Talat stated that resistance 
to the reunification talks by northern Cypriots will only harm Turkey‘s 
progress towards accession.
331
  
V. CONCLUSION 
Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union represents the 
latest and probably most critical challenge in the 200-year history 
of Ottoman and Turkish efforts to adopt the European political, 
economic, and cultural paradigm. 
–Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Turkey’s Accession to the European 
Union: Debating the Most Difficult Enlargement Ever
332
 
The 2009 political and judicial developments in the EU, Turkey, and 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus plainly show a more negative 
context of Turkey‘s EU accession negotiations. These events and the 
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currents underlying them suggest, moreover, that Turkey will not achieve 
full accession in this era. 
The broad rise of anti-Islamic, anti-Turkey rhetoric, and enlargement 
fatigue in general, concurrent with the right-wing sweep in the European 
Parliament elections, bode ill for Turkey‘s accession progress. The 
ongoing accession dialogue between Turkey and the EU has advanced 
slowly and has proven largely unproductive of its aims. The numerous 
vetoes of the accession negotiations, in this context of rising anti-Turkey 
politics, flatly halt substantive negotiations on fundamental aspects of the 
accession process. In the same year, the European Court of Justice‘s 
powerful Apolostides judgment coincided with the arrival of the new right-
wing TRNC government, further tainting the environment for compromise 
on the Cyprus division, which is key to Turkey‘s accession. These new 
events highlight the negative environment engulfing the process as to 
warrant the conclusion that Turkey and the EU should modify the present, 
unfruitful accession discussion, and advance to a new, realistic framework 
for constructive dialogue and collaboration. 
Chrysotomos Pericleous, a writer with a broad international education 
and first hand experience in the Cyprus issues, recently expressed 
foreboding if the Cyprus division is not resolved and Turkey continues to 
be excluded from the European Union: 
[The EU‘s] failure to restructure its political project and undertake 
the balancing role between the United States and Islam that history 
bestows on it will leave the way open for Huntington‘s ‗prophesy‘ 
while Europe, confining itself to the margins of international 
developments, will suffer the consequences of such a catastrophic 
course. The direct consequence of a possible exclusion of Turkey 
from Europe will certainly fall, after the Turkish people, on Cyprus 
and Greece. In particular, with the Cyprus problem unresolved, and 
Aegean disputes still pending, the dangers will be even greater.
333
 
He also worries that Turkey could ―return to the aggressive attitudes of 
the first half of the twentieth century against both Greece and Cyprus.‖334 
Resolution of these issues is all the more urgent because the EU and the 
Greek Cypriots faced a December 2009 deadline to decide how to handle 
the scheduled review of Turkey‘s compliance with its obligations to 
extend formal recognition to the Republic of Cyprus.
335
 December 2009 
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represents a perilously critical intersection for Turkey, Cyprus, and 
Europe. 
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